 Article I of the Charter of the United Nations provides the Organization’s aims, one of which is “to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character”. One way to achieve that aim has been to reinforce international cooperation through the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which was elaborated a few years after the Charter came into force.

The 1961 Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol and its companion conventions, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, address one of the great challenges of our time, namely, to ensure the availability of substances under international control for the relief of pain and suffering, but doing so in a manner that avoids increasing the likelihood of the illicit trafficking and use of those substances and the social and economic harms that such use can cause.

 In those conventions, States made it clear that they aimed to address their common challenges through joint action: in the preamble to the 1961 Convention as amended, the Parties asserted that effective measures against the illicit use of narcotic drugs required coordinated and universal action because they understood that that was the most effective way to protect their citizens and provide for their medical and scientific needs.¹

Similarly, Parties to the 1971 Convention gave expression to their belief that taking effective measures to provide psychotropic substances for the needs of their citizens while protecting against trafficking in those substances required coordination and universal action, and that only a widely-respected international convention could achieve those objectives.²

 Recognizing the growing challenges posed by the world drug problem and the need to broaden the scope of cooperation in international drug control, Member States negotiated and adopted the 1988 Convention. Breaking new ground, the Member States incorporated into the Convention provisions against money-laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals, and comprehensive articles that encourage and facilitate international cooperation in criminal matters, including to tackle drug trafficking, and assigned new responsibilities to INCB to manage the trade in chemicals used to manufacture plant-based drugs and synthetic drugs.

 Within the United Nations drug control framework, several actors play a crucial role with respect to the conventions: foremost, the States Parties themselves, along with the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, WHO, INCB and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has delegated his role in that respect to UNODC. Over the years, several other actors have emerged as vital stakeholders, assisting States in implementing their legal obligations and political commitments and enabling the functioning of the systems of licit trade and precursor control, supporting efforts related to prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, ensuring availability, and facilitating law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Among those actors are civil society organizations; private sector entities, including manufacturers of substances under international control; the healthcare industry; the world’s postal systems and firms engaged in international commerce; and international and regional organizations. All have been vital in facilitating availability and preventing trafficking.

 Notwithstanding the existence of this robust framework, its effective functioning has come under considerable strain owing to more recent challenges, not least those posed by the global synthetic drug problem. Synthetic drugs present an increasing challenge because of their high potency, relative ease of manufacture and ability to be concealed, compared with plant-based drugs. The legitimate medical use of many synthetic drugs, combined with the widespread availability of dual-use precursor chemicals, has enabled criminal groups to exploit regulatory gaps and circumvent existing control mechanisms, making it difficult for States and other actors to respond effectively.

 An additional, ongoing challenge is the unequal access to and availability of affordable opioid analgesics, such as morphine, to meet the legitimate medical needs of populations, particularly for pain management and palliative care. The consumption of morphine and other opioid analgesics remains heavily concentrated in developed countries in North America and Europe, while developing countries in other regions continue to maintain lower levels of consumption. That disparity is not due to an insufficient supply of opiate raw materials but may be a result of estimates of requirements by some countries that do not accurately reflect their medical needs; it may also arise in the context of humanitarian emergencies that impede access to opioid analgesics. Adequate availability relies on the capacity of Governments to provide accurate estimates of their needs and on simplified control measures during emergency situations, as provided for in the conventions.

 Challenges to international cooperation in drug control have also arisen in the multilateral sphere. In particular, States members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs have, over the past several years, increasingly found themselves in disagreement over the conventions’ applicability to the non-medical use of cannabis and other matters, including alternative development and the appropriate measures to deal with the negative health and social consequences of drug use (i.e. harm reduction measures).³

In 2024, for the first time in its history, the Commission, at its sixty-seventh session, adopted two resolutions by means of voting,⁴ effectively breaking what has been known as the “Vienna spirit” of cooperation and compromise, whereby resolutions have been adopted by consensus and without a vote. The Vienna spirit has been a key factor in promoting a sense of common and shared responsibility among countries in addressing the world drug problem, but has, without a doubt, been affected by diverging views and practices with regard to implementing obligations under the conventions. The trend away from consensus-based decision-making continued during the Commission’s sixty-eighth session, in 2025, when Commission members requested votes on all draft resolutions.

 All these challenges underscore the need for adaptive policy responses by Governments and strengthened political will to meet obligations and commitments and address common problems effectively. To assist Member States in strengthening their engagement in international cooperation in drug control and in raising awareness of current challenges and opportunities related to the international drug control system, the present chapter provides an overview of the work of the Board in reinforcing the cooperative efforts of States Parties through its treaty-mandated functions, programmes and initiatives. In particular, the Board’s work in support of licit trade and control systems under the conventions is highlighted. The chapter also contains information on the Board’s extensive cooperation with regional and international partner organizations, particularly in relation to the operational aspects of drug control, as well with civil society and the private sector, which represent two other key groups of stakeholders within the international drug control system. The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening international cooperation with a view to responding to the contemporary challenges posed by the world drug problem.

INCB Annual Report 2025

After 15 years as Executive Director of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), Ann Fordham is stepping down, marking the end of 17 years with the organisation.

In this interview with Péter Sárosi, she reflects on the evolution of global drug policy and the role of civil society in driving reform.

When Fordham joined IDPC in 2008 as its first staff member, human rights were largely absent from discussions at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). Today, she notes, they are 'front and centre' — a shift driven by sustained civil society advocacy. Progress on harm reduction has also been significant, despite continued political resistance.

Fordham highlights IDPC’s growth from a small coordination platform into a global network and authoritative voice at the UN. For her, the organisation’s greatest achievement has been strengthening a diverse and principled movement: 'I’m just so incredibly proud of what we’ve built together.'

She also points to major changes in civil society participation at the CND. Once marginalised, NGOs and community networks now play a visible role in shaping debates and organising advocacy. However, she warns that this space remains under threat and must be actively protected.

The integration of human rights into drug policy discussions — particularly since the 2016 UNGASS — is another key milestone. Yet Fordham cautions that progress is fragile, with some governments seeking to roll back commitments.

Reflecting on her tenure, she emphasises the importance of ambition and collective action: ¡We remain hopeful that a different world is possible.'

Her message to governments is clear — meaningful reform requires political courage and a break from punitive approaches that have failed to deliver.

'I’m incredibly proud of what we built': Ann Fordham on leaving IDPC after 17 years

March 2026 marked my final UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) as Executive Director of IDPC. Sitting in the plenary, watching yet another round of fraught negotiations unfold, I found myself thinking back to my first CND in 2009—and just how much has changed but also the cyclical nature of geopolitics.

At my first CND, I watched a group of member states fight valiantly to include the term “harm reduction” in the 2009 Political Declaration— only to be forced to accept a last-minute compromise to include the term “related support services”. Germany, 

, clarified that they would interpret the term “related support services” used in the Political Declaration “as including measures that a number of States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations called “harm reduction measures”. The CND’s reliance on consensus had allowed a small number of countries, notably Russia and the United States, to block explicit, evidence-based language. That dynamic would hold for more than a decade, right up until the so-called “Vienna consensus” began to unravel in 2024.

Seventeen years later, I returned to Vienna for my final CND in this role—and this time, “harm reduction” was back on the table as part of a resolution on a broader, comprehensive public health framework, tabled by Norway and Finland. Its inclusion is not just symbolic. It reflects the slow, often frustrating, but ultimately undeniable shift in CND debates over the past two decades: a growing recognition that harm reduction is a rights-based, evidence-driven, and fundamentally humane response to drugs.

This shift began to crystallise in 2024, when 

harm reduction was explicitly included in a CND resolution for the first time

—ironically led by the United States under the Biden administration. 

, breaking with decades of consensus practice. The 2024 resolution was backed by 38 of the 53 countries with a vote (with 6 abstaining, 7 absent and only China and Russia voting against).

By 2026, the landscape had shifted again. The 

, which contains many positive commitments in addition to the specific reference to harm reduction, was adopted with 45 votes in favour—including China. Burkina Faso and Qatar abstained; only the United States and Argentina voted against. The United States, now under a very different administration, called for the vote and argued that harm reduction “contributes to the normalisation of drug use”— a 180-degree (but not unexpected) U-turn from their position of leadership and coalition building in 2024. Crucially, Russia – stripped of CND voting rights for the first time this year – had also agreed to the resolution text around the negotiating table. As one delegate remarked to me: “That is as close to consensus as you can get nowadays”. But diplomatic compromises were made to achieve this result and to ensure that as many States as possible voted in favour (or at least abstained). It is likely that the desire to isolate the United States – who objected during negotiations (and throughout the CND – more on this below) to references to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and gender rather than explicitly to ‘harm reduction’. The compromises accepted include a footnote declaring that “Harm reduction is not a universally agreed concept among Member States”, and UNODC’s contested language that all responses are “part of a recovery-oriented continuum of care”.

The CND’s self-imposed taboo over ‘harm reduction’ has been broken for good, but the strategic gain does leave us with language that needs to continue to evolve and strengthen in the coming years.

The 69th CND unfolded against a backdrop of deep geopolitical fragmentation, with the US once again at its centre. In this context, one of the most significant procedural shifts of recent years has now firmly taken hold: voting has become the norm.

For the second consecutive year, every resolution went to a vote on the final day. India called a vote on a Mexico-led resolution. China called a vote on a US resolution. And the US led the charge against the other three resolutions (driven by its domestic reactionary agenda against any mentions of gender, sustainable development, the WHO, etc).

This new reality is reshaping how negotiations unfold. One notable example was the 

 led by Thailand, Germany and Peru which included a lengthy annex to update and complement the 

2013 UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development

. Faced with entrenched US opposition to core concepts such as the SDGs, the sponsors ended negotiations early and submitted a final draft on which they were not willing to compromise further after just two days of the CND (Tuesday 10th March). It was a pragmatic recognition that prolonged negotiations were unlikely to yield further progress and that the resolution would ultimately be taken to a vote. This approach contrasted with the resolution sponsors who still sought to find consensus and continue negotiations right up until the close of play on Thursday. The resolution ultimately passed with 46 votes in favour, opposed only by the United States and Argentina. But Russia hinted in its closing remarks that it may seek to reopen the text at ECOSOC—a move that, if pursued, could fundamentally undermine the authority of the CND as an operational commission.

At the same time, we are seeing the emergence of a two-tier system of “agreed language”. Whereas “agreed language” from previous resolutions was often a safe choice for new documents, on several occasions during negotiations this month, member states showed resistance to “agreed language” from resolutions that they did not vote for (such as on the issue of harm reduction from the 2024 resolution). Again, this has big implications for how future resolutions are drafted and steered to adoption.

The United States: isolated, yet disruptive

Another defining feature of this year’s CND was the posture of the US and the Trump Administration’s disdain for international law, diplomacy and multilateralism. For the second year in a row, the US came to the CND with an incredible show of arrogance and inflexibility – although their overall tone was perhaps more conciliatory than last year, inviting other countries to join a renewed ‘war on drugs’ and securing a seat for their candidate on the independent expert panel created to review the drug control machinery. However, they remained extraordinarily isolated in their ideological push against gender, sustainable development and the WHO. It is remarkable, and welcome, that the world’s self-proclaimed pre-eminent superpower was only able to get Argentina to vote with it – while new global alliances form in opposition to the US positions.

More troubling, however, was the broader narrative shift. Security-based approaches dominated the discourse. Even traditional champions of public health—Canada and several EU member states among them—placed greater emphasis on supply reduction in their statements. The opening statements by the UNODC and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reinforced this trend and emphasised border control and interdiction (as clear funding pitches to the US). In return, the USA made no apologies for its resurgent ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric – boasting about the use of lethal military force, highlighting initiatives such as the 

 and the forcible capture of Nicolás Maduro.

These developments raise profound legal and ethical concerns. Since the launch of ongoing military operations against so-called “narcoterrorist” boats, more than 150 people have reportedly been killed. Little is known about their identities, or whether they were in fact involved in drug trafficking— though even that does not justify extrajudicial force. Such actions stand in clear violation of international law, human rights law, and the drug control conventions themselves as has been 

And yet, at CND, these issues were largely left unchallenged — with Brazil being a rare exception. The intervention by the UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights was one of the strongest I have ever heard in plenary — calling on member states to differentiate clearly between terrorism and drug trafficking and providing a sobering list of the human rights risks associated with their conflation.

The politics surrounding the independent expert panel offered a final illustration of the current moment. After securing the nomination of its candidate, the US withdrew her candidacy for co-chair— clearly sensing a lack of support, not least because of concerns over geographical representations (the other co-chair having already been confirmed as Allan Rock from Canada). In a surprising twist, Morocco also withdrew its candidate, Khalid Tinasti, at the last minute, seemingly under political pressure from the US. This left Singapore’s nominee, Natalie Y-lin Morris-Sharma, to be appointed to the role unopposed.

These manoeuvres speak to a broader reality: the multilateral system is under acute strain. In little more than a year, President Trump has jeopardised the financial viability of the United Nations (including UNODC), threatened its long-standing allies, and openly violated the UN Charter with military aggression, kidnappings and wars. There is nothing new in the US instrumentalising the ‘war on drugs’ for the sake of its geopolitical ambitions. But the shameless disregard for international law and peace presents a new challenge to the multilateral system that weighed heavily on many attending the CND.

From 2009 to today: progress, people and persistence

As I reflect on my last time at the CND as IDPC's Executive Director, I am filled with mixed emotions. Despite deep and worrying geo-political fractures, we have made meaningful progress - most powerfully encapsulated in the political recognition of 'harm reduction'. I can't help but think back to 2009, when such an explicit mention seemed so far out of reach.

The other big and hard-won shift, instrumental to progressive debate, is the hugely expanded space for civil society in this setting. The IDPC network and our allies have truly changed the terms of the debate in Vienna, bringing lived experiences to the fore, highlighting the human cost of punitive policies, engaging the UN human rights system, and mobilising other UN entities on health and development.

I leave this role with a deep gratitude for, and pride in, my civil society colleagues and friends. Without our collective advocacy, the CND debate would not be what it is today. We have centred human rights, harm reduction, health and development outcomes in these deliberations. But these debates are not abstract. The words negotiated in Vienna shape policies that affect the health, dignity and lives of people around the world. Progress has been uneven, often hard-won, and never guaranteed but it matters. The struggle for reform is far from over. But the movement is strong, united, persistent and unafraid to demand change.

Stubborn progress in a fractured system: Reflections on a CND in transition

 Tuesday, 31 March 2026 / 13:00 - 14:30 (London time – 

Against the backdrop of unprecedented dynamics at recent sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs — such as the return of voting at the 67th session and diplomatic sparring over the Sustainable Development Goals at the 68th session — this year's session takes place under the sign of major geopolitical turmoil, funding crises, and growing dissent over the future of global drug policy.

This webinar will provide an early opportunity to unpack key outcomes from the 69th session, assess political dynamics in Vienna, and explore what they mean for sustainable drug policy reform.

 (Moderator) — International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)

 — Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations in Vienna

 — Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS)

 — Independent expert; former Secretary General of Uruguay’s National Drug Board and former Ambassador to the Organization of American States

— International Network of People who Use Drugs (INPUD)

— Students for Sensible Drug Policy International (SSDP International)

 — International Coalition on Environmental Justice and Drug Policy Reform

CND 69 and drug policy reform: Unpacking key implications

Thursday, 12 February 2026, 1:00–2:00 PM CET (Vienna time, UTC+1)

 is inviting all member organisations and interested NGOs to participate in an informal online meeting to exchange updates related to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).

The meeting will provide an opportunity for civil society to receive clarifications on participation modalities, hear directly from the UNODC Secretariat, and learn more about planned activities by the UNODC Civil Society Unit and VNGOC during the CND.

Speaker: Ms. Doris Resch, UNODC Secretariat to the Governing Bodies

UNODC Civil Society Unit & VNGOC activities during the CND

VNGOC Q&A on the 69th CND

Wednesday, 25 February 2026 / 14:00 - 15:00 (London) - 

The tenth edition of the IDPC webinar on the regular session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) focuses on its 

, which will take place in Vienna from 9-13 March 2026.

The webinar will shed light the key issues that are likely to structure the debates, discuss tabled resolutions and opportunities for engagement, and showcase the experience of IDPC network members in navigating and leveraging this forum for political advocacy.

This event will be available in English, Spanish and French.

CND 69: Key issues and opportunities

Judgment of the Court in Case C-271/23 | Commission v Hungary (Rescheduling of cannabis)

Hungary, which cannot argue that the common position is unlawful, infringed the European Union’s exclusive external competence in that field, and acted in breach of the principle of sincere cooperation.

In November 2020, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision on the common position to be taken by the Member States, on behalf of the European Union, at the subsequent session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The purpose of that common position was, inter alia, to amend the scheduling of cannabis and cannabis-related substances in two United Nations Conventions, namely the Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, following a recommendation by the World Health Organization.

When voting on those recommendations, Hungary’s representative not only voted in breach of the common position adopted by the Council, but also made a statement contradicting that common position.

In view of that situation, the European Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against Hungary. According to the Commission, Hungary infringed the European Union’s exclusive external competence and the Council decision on the common position, and acted in breach of the principle of sincere cooperation. In its defence, Hungary argued, principally, that that Council decision was unlawful.

In its judgment, the Court rules in favour of the Commission and finds that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law.

The Court notes that the Council Framework Decision on drug trafficking defines the concept of ‘drug’ by referring to the two abovementioned United Nations Conventions. Decisions amending the scheduling of substances in those conventions can affect the application of the penalties laid down in that framework decision, and therefore can affect and alter EU law directly. The adoption of a position to be taken by the Member States on behalf of the European Union with regard to such decisions thus falls within the European Union’s exclusive competence.

Hungary disregarded that competence in the present case by acting in the way it did. That Member State thereby also infringed the Council decision on the common position that had been adopted in exercise of that exclusive competence.

Under the principle of sincere cooperation, the Member States are required to facilitate the achievement of the European Union’s tasks and must abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of common objectives. In the present case, by voting, within an international body, against a common position of the Council, Hungary compromised that principle as well as the principle of unity in the international representation of the European Union and its Member States. By disassociating itself from the common strategy established within the Council, it weakened the European Union’s negotiating power with regard to the other parties to the Convention.

Lastly, the Court states that, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, a Member State cannot properly plead that an act of an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is unlawful. That would amount to allowing a Member State to take the law into its own hands by first infringing EU law and then waiting for the Commission to bring proceedings against it by way of an action for failure to fulfil obligations. That would run counter to the principle of the rule of law and the duties of solidarity which are accepted by the Member States and which form part of the fundamental basis of the legal order of the European Union. The position could be different only where the Member State challenges an act that contains such particularly serious and manifest defects that it could be categorised as a non-existent act.

If the Court of Justice finds that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, the Member State concerned must comply with the Court’s judgment without delay. Where the Commission considers that the Member State has not complied with the judgment, it may bring a further action seeking financial penalties.

Hungary infringed EU law by voting against the Council’s common position regarding the rescheduling of cannabis, EU Court rules

Statement to be delivered at the 68th Reconvened Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

I am making this statement on behalf of the International Drug Policy Consortium and 56 other civil society, community and Indigenous organisations, regarding the outcome of the critical review of the coca leaf by the World Health Organization’s ECDD.

We express our profound disappointment at the decision by the ECDD to keep the coca leaf within schedule I of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

The coca leaf is a plant that has been cultivated and used by Indigenous Peoples in the Andean-Amazonian region for ancestral, religious, cultural, nutritional and medicinal purposes for millennia. The inclusion of the plant in Schedule I of the Single Convention was a historical error, based on deeply flawed, racist studies and arguments.

Dismantling the colonial legacy of the UN drug control regime, and aligning international drug policy with human rights - including the rights of Indigenous Peoples - was a key reason for Bolivia’s request to initiate this critical review in the first place.

And yet, the ECDD recommendation to keep the coca leaf in Schedule I of the Convention fails to redress the historical wrong committed in 1961. It overlooks the millennia of Indigenous knowledge of the coca leaf - and sidelines the rights of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination, to the use of their natural resources, and to the preservation of their culture, traditional medicines and health practices. It also fails to adequately reflect new evidence of the therapeutic, nutritional and industrial uses of the coca leaf which are now widespread in the Americas and other parts of the world.

Furthermore, the critical review process has given little to no attention to the additional human rights impacts of retaining the coca leaf in the 1961 Single Convention. Today, thousands of families depend on coca cultivation to survive. Militarisation and forced eradication campaigns, especially in fragile ecosystems and Indigenous lands, have caused devastating harms for affected communities’ right to safe water, to food security, to health, and to a healthy environment, as well as the right to life - as coca farmers and human rights defenders in cultivation areas have faced violence and death as a result of punitive policies.

This critical review process once again showcases the inability of the international drug control system to question the failings of the punitive paradigm, to better align with human rights principles - which should be at the core of the UN system as a whole - and to move towards meaningful reforms.

In the midst of geopolitical turmoil, a funding crisis, and UN system reform, this was an ideal opportunity for the UN drug control system to show that it can adapt, repair past mistakes, and confront and dismantle colonial legacies. The ECDD has failed to do this, and is simply propping up an outdated regime that has so clearly failed to achieve any of its stated objectives.

European Network of People who Use Drugs (Ireland)

Washington Office on Latin America (United States of America)

New Zealand Drug Foundation (New Zealand)

Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) - United States and Global

Finnish Association for Humane Drug Policy (Finland)

Institute for Policy Studies, Drug Policy Project (United States of America)

International Network of People who Use Drugs - INPUD (UK, Global)

Ukrainian Network of People who Use Drugs - VOLNa (Ukraine)

Belgian Network of People who Use Drugs - BeNPUD (Belgium)

México Unido Contra la Delincuencia A.C. (México)

Drug Policy Alliance (United States of America)

International Coalition For Drug Policy Reform & Environmental Justice (Global)

Transform Drug Policy Foundation (United Kingdom)

RESET - Drug Policy and Human Rights (Argentina)

International Indigenous Drug Policy Alliance (Global)

Aboriginal Drug and Alcohol Council South Australia

Suar Perempuan Lingkar Napza Nusantara (SPINN), Indonesia

Association for Humane Drug Policy (FHR) (Norway)

Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat (Indonesia)

Zimbabwe Civil liberties and Drug Network (Zimbabwe)

Intercambios Civil Association (Argentina)

Groupement Romand d’Études des Addictions (Switzerland)

Indonesian Harm Reduction Network (JANGKAR, Indonesia)

UNIDOS - Rede Nacional de Redução de Danos (Moçambique)

Africa Network of People Who Use Drugs (Africa)

La Testería / Barbies Testeadoras del Bajío (México)

A critical failure of a system still mired in the past - IDPC joint statement at the CND Reconvened 68th Session

The reconvened 69th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs is expected to take place on 3-4 December 2026 in Vienna, Austria.

Reconvened CND 69th Session

The 69th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) takes place at the Vienna International Centre (VIC) between 9-13 March 2026. For general information on the CND, check out the dedicated section of our website on 

Deadline for registration: Thursday, 5 March 2026

Organisations in consultative status with ECOSOC may nominate delegates to attend the session in person. Registration must be completed via the 

 and requires an official nomination letter on the organisation’s letterhead. The session's 

 publicly. The Committee of the Whole will be in-person only.

The Vienna NGO Committee (VNGOC) will hold an NGO briefing on Monday, 9 March, 9:00 (Room M3 — and 

Stay on top of the session with the CND App!

Track what’s happening and where, build a custom schedule, access draft resolutions and follow their negotiations, consult agreed UN language on drug policy, keep tabs on speakers at the plenary, access meeting links and more!

The CND App is available on 

The webinar unpacks key issues that are likely to structure the debates at CND, reviews draft resolutions, and showcases IDPC network members’ experiences leveraging the Commission for advocacy. Speakers include representatives from Youth RISE, SANPUD, and GREA. 

As in previous years, the VNGOC has coordinated several informal NGO dialogues with representatives from relevant UN bodies:


Thursday, 12 March, 09:00-10:00, Boardroom D & 


Thursday, 12 March, 11:15-12:15, Boardroom D & 


Thursday, 12 March, 12:15-13:15, Boardroom D & 


Thursday, 12 March, 15:00-16:00, Boardroom D & 

Five resolutions have been tabled and will be negotiated by Member States. 

 are taking place throughout the session. The full list is available in the 

and many are freely accessible remotely.

 co-organise 41 side events at the session — 

Breaking the sentence: Women, drug policy, incarceration and paths to reform in Latin America

 - Wednesday, 11 March 2026 (18:30-21:00)
Across Latin America, punitive drug laws are fueling a crisis: the mass incarceration of women. This urgent panel brings together leading advocates and researchers to expose the human cost, share new country findings, and spotlight bold, evidence-based reforms to break cycles of injustice and marginalisation. 

The UNGASS decade in review: Gaps, achievements and paths for reform

 — Our most recent report, assessing a decade of limited progress and persistent harms, and formulating avenues toward systemic reform.

Vienna after consensus: Report of the 68th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs

 — An analysis of last year's meeting that brings the 69th Session into context.

The UN review of the international status of the coca leaf

 — Our dedicated page with resources on the process, key contributions towards it, and responses to its troubling outcome.

International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care (IAHPC)

Eurasian Harm Reduction Association (EHRA)

69th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)

The consumption of the coca leaf in its raw form by millions daily across the Andes carries no significant risks, but official coca control strategies are associated with “substantial public health harms,” according to a review commissioned by the World Health Organization. Filter viewed an advance copy of the report that was distributed to members of the WHO’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD).

Coca, the mildly stimulating and medicinal leaf that is the base ingredient of cocaine, was banned globally by the UN in 1964 after its investigators claimed coca leaf chewing is “definitely harmful” and “the cause of racial degeneration of many population groups.” A WHO paper also described the use of the calcium-rich plant as “a social evil.”

But despite US-backed militarized efforts to eradicate coca leaf production in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador throughout the decades-long drug war, the consumption of the plant—which for many Indigenous communities holds profound spiritual value—has remained stubbornly prevalent, with production in Colombia at all-time highs.

“Research reviewed for this report did not reveal evidence of clinically meaningful public health harms associated with coca leaf use,” states the comprehensive scientific review commissioned by the ECDD. “The research record does, however, robustly document the substantial public health harms associated with coca control strategies at all scales.”

Commission on Narcotic Drugs