On 8 October 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted Resolution 60/26, ‘The human rights implications of drug policy’. The resolution – tabled by Colombia on behalf of a cross-regional Core Group composed of Albania, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Guatemala, Portugal, Uruguay and Switzerland – was adopted without a vote, and supported by 35 co-sponsors.

The objective of the resolution was threefold: firstly, to assert the role of the HRC to engage in the human rights dimension of drug policy debates in its own right, instead of contributing to processes taking place in Vienna or New York; secondly, to strengthen the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in providing guidance and recommendations on how to better align drug policies with human rights instruments; and thirdly, to consolidate and expand human rights language in relation to drug policy.

In a way, all three objectives were achieved. This advocacy outlines and analyses the strategic importance of Resolution 60/26 and its implications for the future of drug policy.

The Human Rights Council asserts its role in drug policy

The 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs was a watershed moment in global drug policy. It created a rare opportunity to reconsider the prevailing international paradigm on drugs and to chart a new direction.

The UNGASS process was notable for the unprecedented involvement of civil society, affected communities, UN entities and human rights experts. It helped place public health, human rights and communities closer to the centre of drug policy-making, and paved the way for better alignment between the UN drug control regime and the wider UN system. The process also generated valuable momentum for new debates and advocacy at the national level.

However, the UNGASS ultimately fell short of introducing genuine reform of the norms and institutions underpinning the international drug control system.

This report examines progress made since the 2016 UNGASS to assess the role of the global drug control regime in shaping change. It draws on UN data and reporting, academic research, contributions from civil society and community organisations, and a dedicated civil society survey conducted among IDPC members and partners.

The report concludes with four forward-looking findings:

Civil society and community organisations play a critical role in drug policy

, yet continue to be sidelined, underfunded, and increasingly exposed to threats and attacks.

The UN drug control treaties require urgent modernisation

 in order to respond to new realities and remain fit for purpose.

A drug control system oriented towards human rights, health and development

 requires a thorough reconfiguration of the existing architecture, including strong and systematic inter-agency cooperation across the UN system.

Regular discussion of drug policy at the UN is essential

, but the agenda and working methods of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) must change to enable meaningful progress.

The UNGASS decade in review: Gaps, achievements and paths for reform

Today marked a turning point in global drug policy, as Members of the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted 

 on ‘The human rights implications of drug policy’. After weeks of intense negotiations, and months of civil society advocacy, this was a hard-fought win.

The resolution – introduced by Colombia on behalf of a cross-regional group – was 

 by consensus, and has so far been supported by 35 co-sponsors.¹ This reinforces the role of human rights in drug policy debates precisely as the international community embarks on an 

 of the global drug control regime. A shifting geopolitical landscape - with the USA now openly carrying out extrajudicial killings off the coast of Venezuela in the name of drug control - made the urgency of this initiative clearer than ever to many in Geneva.

The strategic objective of the resolution was threefold: first, to assert the role of the HRC to engage in drug policy debates in its own right, instead of contributing to processes taking place outside of Geneva; second, to strengthen the mandate of OHCHR in providing guidance and recommendations on how to better align drug policies with human rights instruments; and third, to consolidate and expand human rights language in relation to drug policy.

In a way, all three objectives were achieved.

Asserting the role of the Human Rights Council in global drug policy

This is the fourth HRC resolution dedicated to drug policy and human rights. The first three, adopted in 

, aimed to feed into drug policy processes taking place in New York (around the 2016 UNGASS) and Vienna (2024 midterm review). This time, the objective was to separate the work of the HRC from processes outside of Geneva, and to assert the independent role of the Council to address the human rights impacts of drug policy.

Of course, this was met with resistance from various Member States, fearing that this might somehow undermine the international drug control regime and weaken the role of the CND and UNODC. Countries like Algeria, China, Cuba and Russia all made statements to that effect as the resolution was adopted. And this was one of the key arguments brought forward by Singapore during the informals. It should be noted here that, as Singapore was questioning the resolution in Geneva, it was internationally criticised for yet another execution of a person for a drug offence back home.

The Core Group and its allies countered this attack. In his presentation of the resolution today, Colombia’s Ambassador made it clear that the purpose of the resolution was in fact to 

 between the UN human rights system and UN drug control bodies, ensuring more synergy on drug policy, in light of the widespread human rights abuses committed in the name of drug control.

There, the Ambassador specifically mentioned the alarming recent military strikes (by the USA) in the Caribbean sea as a justification for this resolution - an act that was 

 as a blatant violation of the right to life by a number of UN human rights experts. ‘This item should remain on the Council’s agenda’, Colombia continued, as ‘it is essential for supporting States in their commitment to designing drug policies that are more humane, more efficient and more respectful of the rights of all persons’.

Supporting Member States were also well coordinated as the resolution and proposed amendments were considered for adoption by the Council, with Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Mexico, Romania, Spain, Switzerland and the EU each making statements against Russia’s amendments and/or in favour of the resolution. And while African countries remained mostly silent during the proceedings, Ethiopia made a welcome intervention, aligning itself with the ‘aspirations of this resolution to ensure that drug policy is designed and implemented in a manner that upholds human rights, public health, dignity, equality and non-discrimination’.

In the end, the resolution included two key operative paragraphs: one encouraging all relevant HRC mechanisms, OHCHR and the rest of the UN human rights system to ‘share their contribution to addressing the human rights implications of drug policies with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs’, and the other deciding ‘to remain seized of the matter’.

This is the strongest acknowledgement of the role of the UN human rights system in drug policy to date, and an unequivocal commitment for it to be more systematically involved.

A recognition of the role of OHCHR in drug policy discussions

The second objective of the resolution was to provide a standing mandate to OHCHR for the production of periodic reports on specific aspects of drug policy - ensuring that OHCHR can regularly analyse the human rights implications of various facets of drug policy, highlight examples of best practice, and provide much-needed guidance on rights-oriented drug policies.

This was a highly contentious topic during the negotiations, with countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore strongly rejecting the periodic nature of OHCHR reports. In the end, the revised version of L.31 only retained the drafting of one OHCHR report, focusing on the human rights implications of drug policy for women and girls.

That being said, and in sharp contrast with previous resolutions, no State objected to OHCHR producing a new report on the human rights implications of drug policy, nor the organisation of a panel discussion at the Council. In previous years, such a proposal had been met with significant opposition from a small but vocal group of Member States, and led to the introduction of amendments to remove the request. This new development is, in and of itself, a win. It shows that OHCHR’s sustained work on drug policy issues and its presence at the CND and elsewhere have become much more widely accepted than ever before.

The fact that the resolution was adopted by consensus is a reflection of this. Interestingly, few Member States, among them China, Kuwait and Sudan, decided to ‘disassociate’ themselves from the contents of this resolution this time around - in particular on issues relating to women, and the death penalty in the case of Sudan. Algeria and Cuba, on the other hand, expressed their concerns over the resolution and their plans to restrict their interpretation and implementation of the resolution in alignment with their own national legislations.

Consolidating human rights language on drug policy

In terms of content, the resolution not only locks in 

, it also builds on them, expanding the scope and pushing for a broader, more inclusive view of how drug policy intersects with human rights.

the resolution upholds all the significant progress made in 2023

, with regards to commitments to end racial discrimination in drug laws and practices, and to protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their traditional medicines and health practices. Notably, none of these elements were challenged during the negotiations. This highlights the added value of the human rights system compared to the CND, where issues like racial discrimination have never been addressed, and Indigenous rights remain highly contested.

The term ‘harm reduction’, which appeared for the first time in the 2023 HRC resolution on drugs - was not only retained but expanded from one paragraph to three. The Russian proposal (

) to remove the term was rejected with 25 votes against, 10 in favour, and 12 abstentions. In comparison, in 2023 there were 23 votes against, 13 in favour, and 12 abstentions. Small shifts towards normalising the harm reduction approach, which in practice is 

Beyond keeping the language from 2023 intact, the standout changes in 2025 are as follows:

Asserting the leadership of the Human Rights Council in drug policy. 

The rationale for the new resolution is set out in preambular paragraphs 15, 17, and 19. Together, they convey a clear message: the Council has the mandate to promote universal respect for human rights, and drug policies - given their significant human rights implications - fall squarely within that mandate. PP9 in particular asserts that the HRC has the responsibility to promote universal respect for human rights, and that it should promote the effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights within the UN system. This is a useful reminder to Vienna that the Council is ready to take leadership on the human rights dimension of drug policy.

Recognising the work of OHCHR and human rights mechanisms

. In recent years, OHCHR and human rights mechanisms have undertaken ground-breaking work on drug policy, addressing issues such as 

. However, acknowledging this work in political resolutions has long been extremely challenging, as some Member States fear it could undermine the mandate of UNODC. In this resolution, however, cooperation between OHCHR and UNODC is explicitly encouraged as a means to enhance system-wide coherence. The resolution also urges human rights mechanisms to continue examining the human rights implications of drug policy. The next step will be for the CND to recognise the important work done by UN entities outside Vienna with mandates on human rights - an overdue development.

A broader and more diverse understanding of human rights

. This time around, the resolution was tabled by Colombia and this was an opportunity to integrate substantive human rights issues that are particularly relevant to production countries - mostly in the Global South. The best example of this is the inclusion of a first-ever reference to the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment in designing drug policies, and a call to prevent the adverse impacts on the environment not only of drug production and trafficking, but also of drug-policy responses themselves. This was complemented by language on alternative development and emphasising the need to respect traditional uses and to take into consideration the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples when addressing cultivation. None of these additions introduce language that is new to CND texts, but they do help place cultivating communities - a population historically overlooked in Geneva - more firmly at the centre of human rights discussions. We hope that UN human rights mechanisms will follow this call.

. The 2023 resolution had emphasised the contribution of civil society and affected communities to all aspects of drug policy. The 2025 text takes a step further by calling on Member States to ‘create and maintain a safe and enabling environment to ensure that they can operate free from hindrance, insecurity and reprisals’ (OP 8). This is particularly important given the 

 that harm reduction and drug policy organisations are experiencing under the guise of ‘foreign agent’ and ‘drug propaganda’ laws, particularly in the CEEECA region.

. In line with the request to OHCHR to prepare a report on the implications of drug policy for women and girls, the resolution also introduces three new preambular paragraphs on gender. As it was the case for the new paragraphs on alternative development, the language in itself largely borrows from other UN documents and does not present substantive innovations. Instead, the progress here is giving more weight to gender in debates on the human rights dimension of drug policy.

Discarding stigmatising and confusing ‘drug-free’ language

. The resolution marks a gradual shift away from the confusing and stigmatising terminology that has long characterised UN texts. For the first time, it adopts the formulation ‘individuals who use drugs’ instead of ‘individuals with drug use disorders’ in several paragraphs addressing the right to health, stigma and marginalisation, and HIV/AIDS, where the reference to disorders was simply inaccurate. This change helps to dispel narratives that wrongly conflate the two groups. In a crucial development, this is the first Human Rights Council resolution on drugs that excludes the paragraph that has historically committed the international community to achieving a ‘society free of drug abuse’. This language has already been 

 from the two latest resolutions at the UN General Assembly, but it is a mainstay at the CND. In 2023, this language was excluded from the draft proposed by the Core Group, but reintroduced through an amendment; this time around, no amendment was proposed on the text. The goal of a drug-free world has long been used to justify policies that systematically violate human rights, so seeing it slowly disappear from UN resolutions is a welcome development. The CND should be next.

¹ Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, UK, Ukraine and Uruguay

The Human Rights Council asserts its role in drug policy at a time of global change 

Today, the UNODC released its flagship publication - the 

. Despite the agency’s best efforts to convey progress, the report is an indictment of the global drug control regime. Data point after data point reveal a systemic failure to contain drug markets and protect the health of people who use drugs.

In a welcome move, the thematic Booklets in this year’s publication explicitly acknowledge the harmful consequences of punitive policies, and their inability to disrupt drug markets and organised crime. However, this recognition is still limited by the UNODC's self-imposed commitment to preserve the current drug control regime, rather than to openly acknowledge the failure so starkly evidenced in its own report.

The divergence between the UNODC's political messaging and technical reporting is problematic, but not new. As the international community embarks on an independent 

 of the global drug control machinery, the UNODC must provide Member States with an unbiased presentation and narrative around the evidence. UN entities should be honest brokers of information, not spin doctors. Now that Ghada Waly has 

, the future Executive Director must have the courage to engage honestly with Member States on the failings of the current system.

The World Drug Report always opens with a preface by the Executive Director of UNODC. With Ghada Waly having announced her 

 a few weeks ago, the lack of excitement is palpable in this year’s text, which mainly lists the growing challenges in illegal drug market

Only one paragraph proposes solutions, and these are but UNODC's traditional priorities: 'Investing in the prevention of drug use at an early age', criminal justice responses that 'focus on disrupting the illegal market', and – more positively – treatment and services that are tailored and responsive to people's needs. Notably absent are harm reduction, human rights, or any reference to the new 

There is a real disconnect between the policy prescriptions contained in this paragraph and the contents of this year’s World Drug Report, which question the effectiveness of law enforcement, emphasise the evidence for harm reduction, and highlight the consequences of punitive policies. But let’s start with the basic facts.

Drug use is growing, as are drug-related harms.

The 2025 World Drug Report's main headline is that drug use continues to hit record highs. The UNODC estimates that 316 million people (6% of those aged 15-65) used drugs in 2023, up from 243 million in 2013. Growth is concentrated in cannabis and cocaine use. 14 million people injected drugs in 2023, and half of them are living with hepatitis C.

Drug-related deaths increased from over 350,000 in 2011 to over 450,000 in 2021 - unfortunately we lack updated data for later than 2021. An estimated 64 million people experience drug-related problems, a 13% increase over 10 years. Only 1 in 7 men and 1 in 18 women have access to drug treatment. Only 26 of 110 reporting countries provide access to naloxone, and 76 of 133 offer some coverage of opioid agonist treatment.

Law enforcement does not disrupt drug markets, but it can make them deadlier

A thematic Booklet in this year's World Drug Report examines the links between drug trafficking and organised crime. While the topic would appear politically convenient to UNODC - making the case for more investment in law enforcement and drug control - the Booklet contains an illuminating section that assesses  the effectiveness of drug responses.

In a nutshell, the Booklet finds that 'drug markets, as a whole, are highgly resilient to law enforcement intervention'. Indiscriminate actions against trafficking, which are 'a common type of drug law enforcement response', leave 'drug trafficking groups largely unaffected'. Additionally, 'drug seizures and arrests can change the market equilibrium, sometimes reducing purities and increasing prices, but never eliminating the market as a whole'.

In fact, the Booklet acknowledges that crackdowns can drive insecurity, as ‘ violence increases only when those at the very top are removed, suggesting that inner-and inter-group conflict emerges from power vacuums’. Additional research suggests that major drug seizures — especially involving synthetic opioids — have been 

associated with increased overdose deaths

These conclusions are backed by the data provided elsewhere in the Word Drug Report. For instance, seizures of stimulants such as MDMA have more than doubled in 7 years, from under 300 ton equivalents to over 600. Methamphetamine seizures have also doubled from under 200 ton equivalents in 2017 to over 400 in 2023. But the size of both drug markets has continued to grow, which shows that increasing seizures result mostly from the expansion of production. A message that Member States will need to hear loud and clear during the upcoming review of the global drug control regime.

A technical endorsement of harm reduction – with no political backing

A second thematic Booklet concerns the ‘Impact of drug use’ on people who use drugs, families, and communities. The Booklet may be seen as a reaction to the 

 on ‘Drug use and the right to health’, as some Member States felt that it was necessary to switch the focus from the right to health of people who use drugs, to the harmful consequences of drug use.

The Booklet opens with the recognition that ‘most of the harms caused by drug use, the impact of drug use and drug use disorders are preventable or can be mitigated by acting on different modifiers’. Thus, the focus of the chapter shifts from preventing drug use in itself, to preventing its harms. In fact, a significant part of the Booklet is dedicated to explaining that drug use does not automatically result in harms, but that those are mediated and shaped by social and political determinants, including class, race, and gender.

The booklet also contains a summary of the very well-established evidence on the effectiveness of traditional harm reduction interventions for drug use. Newer approaches such as drug consumption rooms and sites, drug checking services, and heroin-assisted treatment are also mentioned. In general, the chapter is a complex and nuanced document that reacts positively to many of the 

 raised by IDPC with regards to last year’s chapter on the ‘Drug Use and the right to health’.

Whilst this is very welcome, the failure once again to explicitly acknowledge ‘harm reduction’ as a holistic, lifesaving approach - rather than a set of technical interventions in response to injecting drug use - continues to hamper the Report and, by extension UNODC itself. It  also puts it  at odds with the rest of the 

, which wholeheartedly endorses harm reduction, and with the entities and experts that have recognised the harms of drug policies themselves (see, for example, the 

 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health).

In a critical development, the Booklet on 'impacts of drug use' recognises that punitive laws and practices exacerbate the harms of drug use. Particularly notable is a direct critique of criminalisation - a very welcome improvement compared to last year’s reports.

Thus, the Booklet notes that 'the criminalization of drug use and resulting incarceration of people who use drugs or have drug use disorders have high costs, both direct and indirect, for individuals, their families and the community.' Additionally, 'Policies that target people in relation to their drug use add to the stigma and discrimination against such people and can also exacerbate the negative impact of drug use on health.' Let us hope that the next UNODC Executive Director to take this recognition from the depths of the report and finally joins other UN entities in calling for the decriminalisation of people who use drugs.

This recognition is important because the punitive thrust of the drug control regime continues unabated. According to new data provided by this year’s World Drug Report, in 2023 6.1 million people were in contact with the criminal legal system for drug-related activities - 4 million for mere possession for personal use. Up to 1.6 million were prosecuted and 850,000 convicted solely for drug possession or use offenses. There can be no doubt that people who use drugs continue to be the main target of the drug control machinery.

Political narratives still permeate the report.

Despite these welcome developments, serious concerns remain regarding the Booklet on 'impacts of drug use'. The chapter's opening framing positions 'drug use' as a driver of societal harms, potentially pitting people who use drugs against their families and communities. While the report acknowledges that social and political determinants mediate harms, this recognition is not consistently applied. For example, at one point the Booklet bizarrely includes the millions spent on criminal justice responses amongst the ‘costs of substance use disorders’.


We are also concerned by claims that 'the children of parents who use drugs or suffer from drug use disorders are also more likely to lack a safe nurturing environment’. Whilst parental drug use may have in some cases impact on the welfare of children, such a generic statement can be deeply stigmatising and harmful in a policy context where many parents - particularly mothers - fear being deprived of parental rights because of mere drug use. It would have been helpful to add a note explaining that, according to existing 

, the sole act of using drugs is not harmful to children and should entail no limitation on rights.

Political bias appears elsewhere in the report. For instance, UNODC fails to acknowledge the possibility that the actual aim of legal regulation may be to curb the power of organised crime - as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk 

. This leaves Member States without evidence on a policy option that could bring success where law enforcement has resoundingly failed.

Human rights are completely absent from the World Drug Report, despite the catastrophic human costs of drug policy, 

 by the UN’s own human rights system. Notably, the 2024 World Drug Report had proposed a framework on the right to health and drug use. Whilst that analysis was 

, it was the first time that the UNODC’s flagship publication touched explicitly on human rights and we hoped it would be continued. It is disappointing to see almost no reference to the right to health in this year’s entire report.

This points to the well documented lack of willingness of UNODC to engage with human rights, which is highlighted in the 

 released today by 70 civil society organisations calling for UNODC and CND to explicitly and unequivocally condemn the use of the death penalty for drug-related offences.

At a time of global rethinking, we need an honest and unbiased UNODC

In sum, the World Drug Report 2025 provides a good example of UNODC’s contorted position. On the one hand, much of the report details the obvious failings of the global drug control regime, as well as the harms it continues to exacerbate. On the other hand, at a political level the UNODC remains committed to defend the 

In March 2025, the CND decided to initiate a historical exercise to rethink the global drug control machinery. This process requires accurate, unbiased information. The Colombian delegation noted as much during the debates, 

We don’t want politically correct reports but accurate ones, that tackle developments and problems that we face, so states know then what to do’

Evidence that cannot be contained: The World Drug Report 2025 reveals the ongoing failure of the drug control regime

This blog post is available in Italian here — translated by Forum Droghe.

UN Member States initiate an overdue review of the UN drug control “machinery” with a newly emerging political alliance

Against a backdrop of global turmoil and multilateral rupture, the 68th session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs ended on Friday 14th March with a turning point in the history of global drug policy. With a striking majority of 30 votes in favour, 18 abstentions, and 3 votes against - Argentina, Russia, and the United States - the United Nations’ main drug policy-making body decided to 

 to rethink the global drug control regime.

The Commission also offered a glimpse of a different multilateral order, led by an emerging new alliance of Global South and Global North countries united in defence of the principle of common and shared responsibility against a belligerent and uncompromising United States. Led by Colombia, this nascent group has the potential to find a cross-regional vision for a new approach to a failed drug control system that wreaks worldwide devastation on health and human rights.

Digesting the true implications of this session will require more time to reflect. Here we offer some initial food for thought in relation to Colombia’s successful initiative.

At the start of the week, the US delegation shook the CND with a breathtakingly 

 that broke the basic premise of the so-called Vienna spirit by disrespecting other Member States in directly naming and blaming Canada, China and Mexico for the US domestic toxic drug crisis that has caused hundreds of thousands of overdose deaths. This was followed with inflexible positions and a general unwillingness to negotiate throughout the week. By Friday arrogance had turned into isolation. At the closing of the session, the United States went on to lose all substantive policy votes, accompanied only by new bedfellows Argentina and Russia.

historical vote on the term ‘harm reduction’

 broke the long-standing adherence to finding consensus as the only possible decision-making process in global drug policy. This year the CND witnessed no less than 10 votes, including voting on all six resolutions.

The new reality - resisted by Member States for so long - that the CND can in fact operate through voting is starting to sink in, and given the fraught state of geopolitics this is unlikely to change anytime soon. Voting frees the CND from pointless negotiations resulting in disappointing and meaningless texts in the name of consensus. Voting may also mean that more progressive resolutions can be passed as it becomes harder for one Member State or a small group of States to hold language hostage. The negotiation tactics at the CND will need to adjust in line with this new climate and Colombia demonstrated excellent diplomatic talent last week towards this end.

Vienna is likely to get even more politicised - but reactionary politics have few supporters

’ and a prohibitionist consensus at the CND has papered over very real frictions in approaches to drug policy - and to world affairs in general. This is no longer the case. The United States chose to put the reactionary culture wars of the Trump administration at the forefront of every intervention. This was particularly notable in the push against the concept of gender, and in the attempt to erase the Sustainable Development Goals from the standing agenda of the CND itself. Crucially, the other States did not cave in just to preserve the Vienna consensus, but stood up to protect these values even if that meant risking a vote.

. The landmark resolution led by Colombia, that noted that the CND has a mandate ‘to consider what changes may be required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs’, establishes a:

‘multidisciplinary panel of 19 independent experts, acting in their personal capacity, to prepare a clear, specific, and actionable set of recommendations aimed at enhancing the implementation of the three drug conventions, as well as the obligation of all relevant international instruments, and the achievement of all international drug policy commitments’.

Ten members of the panel will be appointed by the CND, five by the UN Secretary General, three by the International Narcotics Control Board; and one by the World Health Organisation. Members will be required to reflect a diversity of expertise, regions, and policy approaches.

The panel will have two years to prepare its recommendations, which will feed into the next high-level review of international drug policy commitments in 2029.

This panel constitutes an extraordinary opportunity to propose serious changes to the drug policy regime to truly serve the ultimate aim of the conventions - the protection of the health and welfare of humankind.

The review should integrate expertise that is usually excluded from drug policy-making in Vienna - bringing in the long-standing contributions of UN experts and agencies in the fields of health and human rights. A mandate that includes ‘all relevant international instruments’ is a clear reference to international human rights law, which must play a central role in this assessment.

But make no mistake - political opposition will be fierce at every stage of the process. The liquidity crisis at the UN may be used - by the very same country that caused it - to stall the review. One of several concessions that was made to garner support for the proposal was to make UNODC the secretariat of the panel - which could compromise its effectiveness and objectivity.

Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, Ambassador Laura Gil of Colombia made clear that this process seeks to integrate the needs and concerns of all Member States, even if their approach to the world drug situation diverges from that of Colombia. However, she reminded delegates of the extraordinary high price that her country has paid to fight the drug trade and that urgent change is necessary:

“...every and each Colombian understands and feels that the global drugs problem casts a shadow over all of us, and this panel is an invitation under the aegis of the conventions to rethink, to revisit the principle of common and shared responsibility today, now. And my country has sacrificed more lives than any other in the war on drugs that was imposed on us… Our best men and women, and the lion’s share of our national budget has been devoted to tackling illicit trafficking. We need new and more effective means to implement a global system. Continuing the same will not lead anywhere fruitful.”

With her tireless, inclusive and considerate diplomatic efforts, Ambassador Gil achieved incredible cross regional support for this resolution with Member States that would not traditionally be seen as ‘like-minded’ voting in favour including South Korea, Japan and Zimbabwe among others. Strong supportive words from the Ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire (who also voted in favour) followed her intervention, illustrating clearly the potential of working in a genuinely multilateral spirit. This was also echoed in the coordination of the European Union and other like-minded countries in the Global North, even if that meant going against their closest historical ally - the United States.

Civil society and affected communities, including people who use drugs, Indigenous Peoples and farmers of crops deemed illicit must play a prominent role in the review process.

We have said for years that the consensus-paralysed CND was at risk of losing relevance in global drug policy making. The consensus thawed in 2024 and has now been comprehensively torn apart. The expert panel brings a historical opportunity for change. This opportunity must not be wasted.

CND68: Historic vote initiates overdue review of UN drug control “machinery”

As a Senior Advocacy and Research Associate, Adrià supports IDPC's UN human rights advocacy work. He previously was a Research & Advocacy Officer at IDPC from 2020 to 2024, working on research, advocacy, and civil society capacity building. He has also worked for Harm Reduction International, Amnesty International, and the European Parliament, always with a focus on international advocacy and human rights.

Como Consejero sénior de incidencia política e investigación, Adrià respalda el trabajo de incidencia política del IDPC en favor de los derechos humanos ante las Naciones Unidas. Anteriormente ocupó el cargo de Consejero de investigación e incidencia política en el IDPC entre 2020 y 2024, donde trabajó en los ámbitos de la investigación, la incidencia política y el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de la sociedad civil. También trabajó para Harm Reduction International, Amnistía Internacional y el Parlamento Europeo, siempre en el ámbito de la incidencia política internacional y los derechos humanos.

En tant que Conseiller senior de plaidoyer et de recherche, Adrià soutient le travail de plaidoyer de l'IDPC en faveur des droits humains auprès des Nations unies. Il a précédemment occupé le poste de Chargé de recherche et de plaidoyer à l'IDPC de 2020 à 2024, où il a travaillé dans les domaines de la recherche, du plaidoyer et du renforcement des capacités de la société civile. Il a également travaillé pour Harm Reduction International, Amnesty International et le Parlement européen, toujours dans le domaine du plaidoyer international et des droits humains.

Adrià Cots Fernández

Senior Advocacy and Research Associate

Translations

Related Content

The Human Rights Council asserts its role in drug policy

The UNGASS decade in review: Gaps, achievements and paths for reform

The Human Rights Council asserts its role in drug policy at a time of global change

Evidence that cannot be contained: The World Drug Report 2025 reveals the ongoing failure of the drug control regime

CND68: Historic vote initiates overdue review of UN drug control “machinery”