Transform exists to promote sustainable health and wellbeing by bringing about a just, effective and humane system to regulate and control drugs at local, national and international levels.

Transform fue creada para promover una salud y un bienestar sostenibles mediante la promoción de un sistema justo, eficaz y humano para regular y controlar las drogas al nivel local, nacional e internacional.

Transform a été créé pour promouvoir une santé et un bien-être durables à travers la promotion d’un système juste, efficace et humain pour réguler et contrôler les drogues au niveau local, national et international.

Transform

For too long, the topics of sex, sex work and drugs have shared a common problem: stigma. Join us over a Pieminister pie as we talk about these things head on. We’re cutting through the sensationalist headlines and hearing from the real experts including those most affected. What are the parallels between drugs and sex work policy? Why do we need to talk about chemsex? And, how are you impacted?

Transform Drug Policy Foundation is hosting this event to bring taboo topics together in a room. With your ticket you get a talk with the leaders in their field and enjoy a Pieminister pie for dinner. Grab your ticket now to reserve your spot.

We are pleased to share our acclaimed panel of speakers:

Dr Anastacia Elle Ryan, Founding Director, SISU Group, and Chair, Recovering Justice

Audrey, from Bristol Sex Workers Collective

Monty Moncrieff MBE, Chief Executive of London Friend

Juan Fernández Ochoa, IDPC Campaigns & Communications Officer

Steve Rolles, Senior Policy Analyst at Transform Drug Policy Foundation

Chaired by Alex Feis-Bryce, current CEO of Transform Drug Policy Foundation and former CEO of National Ugly Mugs

 Wednesday, 15th February, 6:30 PM - 9:30 PM

 Engine Room, The Station, Silver St, Bristol BS1 2AG (this venue is wheelchair accessible)

Please note: We are unable to take dietary requests but there will be vegan options available (while stocks last).

Ample parking is available nearby at Cabot Circus.

We want this event to be accessible to everyone. Free tickets are available if, for whatever reason, you're unable to pay. Please get in touch with info@transformdrugs.org.

Transform Drug Policy Foundation is a Bristol-based charity working towards making drug policies that promote health, protect the vulnerable and put safety first. We do not represent any stakeholders in the drug policy landscape beyond the individuals and communities who are directly affected by drug policy failures.

Sex, Drugs and Pieminister

Recent cannabis debates have thrust the issue of cannabis potency back into the limelight. From UK calls to put cannabis in Class A because of rising potency and health harms, to leaked proposals from Germany to cap retail cannabis potency at 15% THC in their soon to be legalised market - the issue remains clouded with misunderstandings. Below is an edited excerpt from Transform's newly updated 3rd edition of 'How To Regulate Cannabis: A Practical Guide' that explores the potency issue; what does potency actually mean, how does it impact on cannabis related risks, and how can it be sensibly regulated?

There is a certain amount of confusion around the concept of cannabis potency­ — both ­what ­it ­means­ in ­technical ­terms,­ and ­what ­its ­implications­ are for the risks associated with the use of different cannabis products consumed in different ways. People are familiar with the concept of alcohol strength, expressed in percentage of alcohol content, and how this relates directly to the effects and risks of how much they consume. Standardised alcohol units are a good example. Key to their utility is that they can be readily translated between different alcohol products. However, the situation is less straightforward with cannabis, and cannot be directly compared for a number of reasons.

Cannabis potency is usually measured in terms of the percentage of its key psychoactive ingredient, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC or simply­ THC),­ but ­THC­ is ­only­ one ­of ­over­ 80 ­different ­cannabinoids­ found­ in ­the ­cannabis ­plant, ­key ­among ­these ­being ­cannabidiol ­(CBD).­ Because ­CBD­ interacts ­with ­and­ modifies ­the ­effects ­of ­THC,­ the ­ratio­ of the two is important not only as it shapes the nature of the subjective cannabis­ experience ­(CBD­ is­ thought­ to ­have ­a ­more­ sedative/calming ­effect), ­but­ also­ because­ CBD­ is­ thought­ to­ have ­anti-psychotic­ properties, ­potentially­ reducing the risks of psychotic episodes or psychotic illness related to cannabis use. The many other cannabinoids present in cannabis are less well understood but their relative proportions may also have subtle influences on the variable effects (and possibly risks) of different strains.

Lower-strength,­ outdoor-grown ­cannabis­ tends­ to­ be ­less­ than­ 10%­ THC,­ while (more commonly) indoor-grown, ‘premium’ cannabis varieties are predominantly in the­ 10-25% ­range.­ The­ potency ­of­ lower-quality ­and ­premium-grade­ resin has historically been roughly the same as this in European markets (but notably rising in recent years), although newer techniques such as solvent or carbon dioxide extractions have­ produced ­oils ­and­ other­ concentrates­, such ­as ­butane ­hash ­oil ­(BHO,­ the semi-solid forms sometimes known as ‘wax’ or ‘glass’)­, that­ have­ extremely ­high­ potencies,­ some­ reaching ­concentrations ­of­ over ­80%­ THC.

Another factor that complicates our understanding of cannabis potency is­ that­ the­ level­ of ­intoxication­ and­ the­ speed­ of­ onset ­of­ effects­, which­ will­ determine ­the ­subjective­ experience,­ depend ­in ­large­ part­ on­ the­ particular preparation, method of consumption, and using behaviours.

A ­given­ amount ­of­ cannabis ­can ­be­ smoked (or vaporised) ­in ­different­ ways­, in ­terms­ of how many inhalations the user takes, how deep the inhalations are and ­how ­long­ they ­are ­held ­in­ the ­lungs­, so ­the ­amount ­of ­active ­content­ that different individuals actually absorb can vary quite considerably. With smoked or vaporised cannabis, the onset of the effects is very rapid, meaning that individuals are able to dose control relatively easily. If they have not reached the desired effect, they will continue. If they have reached it, they can stop. On this basis, potency would seem to be less of a concern for­ inhaled ­cannabis ­use­, indeed ­higher-potency ­cannabis­ could­ mean­ fewer inhalations to achieve the same effect, thereby reducing respiratory risks. However, while such ‘auto-titration’ dose control behaviour is the norm, higher-potency cannabis can still potentially lead to higher total consumption and correspondingly pose greater risks. With more potent varieties a large dose of active content can be received in a single inhalation, and the larger such individual doses are, the harder it becomes to fine tune dosage control, meaning the potential to consume more than planned or desired is increased. This is particularly the case for novice users.

This risk of consuming more than planned (with potentially negative or undesirable effects) will be amplified when the potency of the cannabis being consumed is unknown. However, this problem can be reduced or effectively eliminated in a properly regulated system in which:

Buyers ­are­ able­ to­ choose ­from ­a ­range­ of­ clearly ­labelled ­products­ of­ different potencies

Buyers­ are­ able­ to ­take­ guidance­ from ­licensed, ­trained ­vendors

There ­is ­relevant ­information ­on ­dosage,­ effects ­and ­safer ­use­ at­ point­ of sale and on all packaging

In many parts of the world, notably in Europe, smoked cannabis is also often mixed with varying proportions of tobacco, effectively diluting its potency to levels below those that would be experienced if it were smoked pure, much in the same way that alcoholic spirits can be diluted with mixers to various degrees. While this may reduce some of the above risks relating to high-potency cannabis, any benefits are probably more than outweighed by the risks associated with smoked tobacco.

The increasing average potency of illegal cannabis is a genuine observed phenomenon in the US, and to a lesser extent in Europe, although what appears to be a long-term incremental rise in average potency has provoked many exaggerated ‘reefer madness’-style claims that have little basis in reality. In Western markets at least, the increasing market dominance of indoor-grown ‘premium’ cannabis, combined with likely actual increases in its potency (through selective breeding and developments in intensive growing technologies), has probably pushed average potency up to between two to three times what it was in­ the­ 60s­ and­ 70s.­ Such­ averages­ do,­ however, disguise a great deal of variety within markets and between different localities. There was of course very potent cannabis (particularly in resin form)­ available­ in ­the ­60s­ and­ 70s, ­so ­the­ suggestion that what is being consumed today is a ‘completely different drug’ is misleading: the observed trend is primarily due to there being a greater proportion of more potent varieties on the market.

The emergence of high potency concentrates like BHO is a comparatively recent phenomenon, so relatively little is known about their prevalence and impacts, particularly outside more established medical, and now non-medical markets in North America. But aside from these concentrates, if there is some truth in the 

‘it’s not what we smoked in the 60s’

 claims, it is due to the trend towards higher ratios ­of ­THC ­to­ CBD ­in ­intensively ­farmed­ higher-potency ­cannabis — with CBD­ content ­often ­falling ­to ­near ­zero ­as ­THC­ levels ­have steadily ­crept­ up. ­This ­change ­in ­the­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ ­results ­both ­from­ selective breeding that prioritises high THC content (which commands a higher price), as well some of the newer intensive growing techniques deployed to maximise turnover from a given grow space that can reduce CBD content.

The data on increasing potency is not especially reliable (based primarily on seizures which may not necessarily be a representative sample of markets) and conclusions are widely disputed. It is certainly the case, however, that both the general trend towards increasing potency of herbal cannabis and the ­parallel­ trend ­towards­ increasing­ THC ­to ­CBD ­ratios ­are ­not ­merely­ demand-driven, but are primarily manifestations of illegal market economics. There is an echo here of how, under US alcohol prohibition, the market shifted towards stronger spirits that provided significantly higher profits per unit weight for bootleggers. When alcohol prohibition ended, the market naturally shifted back towards sales of beers and wines. In many US and European markets it is now becoming hard to obtain ­anything ­except­ the­ more­ potent­ varieties­, even­ when individuals would prefer something milder if given the choice. The same shift has yet to be shown for legal markets in North America, suggesting that economic dynamics in more commercial jurisdictions may similarly be more concerned with profit opportunities than public health concerns. This highlights the important role for regulation to play to curb these interests and ensure a careful balance, while protecting public health.

Ensuring the THC and CBD content of all retail cannabis products is routinely tested

Although potency testing and monitoring of cannabis products can be relatively expensive, a reasonable level is not an excessive burden. It is important to acknowledge that technical challenges of accurate testing have often been flagged — noting that potency can vary widely within a crop, batch or even plant (or differing challenges for testing of edibles and other preparations). But such challenges are hardly insurmountable given rapid developments in sampling and testing methodology, and realistic error margins can be built into monitoring systems and regulations.

Routine testing should be built into any regulatory framework, supported by random test purchasing, and be undertaken or commissioned independently by the regulating authorities — with cost burden covered by taxation and producer and vendor licensing fees. The intensity of testing required will become clear from levels of compliance but should err on the side of more rather than less at the outset, in order to establish clear norms and expectations for market actors. The production and in particular sale of products that diverge significantly from their stated potency should be considered a serious licence violation. Allowable error margins and penalties for violations should be clearly established. For instance, Canadian regulations establish variability limits of 15-25% above or below the stated levels of THC and CBD depending on the type of cannabis product, and in some cases the stated potency.

Ensuring consumers are aware of the potency of all retail cannabis products — and their related risks

All retail products should be clearly labelled with potency information covering­ THC ­and ­CBD­ content.­ This ­should ­be ­supported­ with ­related­ information ­on ­risks, potentially­ with ­a­ simplified­ numerical­ (e.g.­1-5)­ strength guide. More detailed standardised information on cannabis potency and related risks should also be made prominently available at point of sale in all retail outlets. Vendors should be trained to give advice on potency and related risk issues.

Controlling the potency of retail products

Having an upper limit on the THC content of retail herbal or resin/oil cannabis for non-medical use could be seen as a sensible precautionary measure, but is problematic for a number of reasons, particularly in a more ­open ­market­ model. ­Beyond ­what­ many­ consumers ­may ­view ­as­ an unfair or unnecessary imposition, the obvious practical issues are exactly where such a threshold would be set and how it could be enforced.

In­ 2012 ­the ­Dutch­ government­ proposed­ a ­prohibition ­on ­sales ­of ­herbal­ cannabis ­over ­15%­ THC, ­although ­this­ move was not approved ­and­ was opposed by almost every government office (including the police, prosecution, and forensic service) that would be involved in enforcing the limit. Research into the proposal suggested that, while the measure could “in theory [provide] a slight health benefit for specific groups of cannabis users (i.e., frequent users preferring strong cannabis…)” in practice it reflected a “political choice and based on thin evidence”. The New Zealand 2020 draft Cannabis Legalisation and Control Bill proposed similar potency limits, promoted as a key way that regulation could take back control of the market and facilitate harm reduction aims. This highlights how such measures continue to be politically useful, even in lieu of evidence as to their practical impact.

Even if most consumers are unlikely to be concerned by an upper limit at or near this level (which would still be considered at least adequately strong herbal cannabis by most) the fact is that any such limit is inevitably quite arbitrary, and as such could lead to arbitrary enforcement outcomes. This is especially the case given the improving but still imperfect nature of both potency control among growers (even with the most carefully cultivated cannabis there will be a certain amount of potency variation between crops, and even within any given crop or sample) and potency testing technology.

If the aim is to encourage the use of lower-potency products as a way of moderating risks, then a more sensible approach would appear to be a combination of:

Strict product testing and labelling requirements that ensure buyers know exactly what they are consuming, enabling them to make informed choices

Consumer­ education­ about­ potency-related­ issues/risks,­ supported ­by­ packaging and point of sale info, and training requirements for vendors

Responsible ­retailing, ­which ­could ­be­ encouraged­ through ­licensing­ requirements for vendor training in how to provide potency and risk advice to purchasers

Variable ­tax ­rates (or other price controls), ­which ­could­ be ­employed ­in­ order ­to­ encourage­ the­ use of less potent products, as is done with alcohol in many countries

If limiting the potency of retail cannabis under a relatively open market model is problematic, under a more regulated market model such as that found in Uruguay it is less of a challenge, as the regulatory authorities license producers to provide the specified products that will be available for sale. Even in this more restricted scenario, cannabis ‘connoisseurs’, or those who desire higher-potency strains, can still be catered for either by provisions on home growing or cannabis social clubs.

Restrictions on sales of high-potency concentrates are a more reasonable proposition if such products are shown to be associated with significantly increased risks, but again such restrictions face the challenges of where any potency threshold should be drawn and how it would be enforced. Such decisions will be significantly shaped by the nature of existing demand and patterns of use. Certainly if there is little or no existing demand for high-potency concentrates, establishing a new framework for making them legally available is likely to be something regulators will naturally want to avoid (advocates for medical cannabis access have made the case that concentrates may have specific medical utility - but such availability is lilely to be via a different regulatory medical channel).

However, given the fast-rising popularity of concentrates in certain regions (particularly North America), prohibiting options for retail access where demand is already established would likely push many consumers back to the illegal market. In US states without regulated non-medical markets, 15% of cannabis consumers report using concentrates within the past 12 months (compared to 22% in legalising states). Legal access to concentrates could be provided instead through membership-based cannabis social clubs, although this could lead to difficulties regulating safe production practices. Some of the newer production techniques for concentrates (such as CO2 and butane extractions) are quite dangerous in inexperienced hands, so licensed production and availability is probably preferable if the alternative is risky home production. For these reasons, the Canadian Cannabis Act and Regulations prohibit at-home butane extraction, instead reserving the right to licensed cultivators, processors, testers and researchers.

If potency threshold limits are adopted for herbal cannabis and/or resin/concentrates­, and ­it ­seems ­inevitable­ that­ some­ jurisdictions­ will ­choose­ to­ do­ so­, it­ will ­be ­important ­to ­make ­sure­ they ­are set ­high­ enough­ to­ cater­ for the large majority of existing demand in a given jurisdiction. If they are set too low it will simply create an opportunity for unlicensed producers to meet the unsatisfied demand. There will need to be constant monitoring of impacts, and the flexibility to adjust (or abandon) such thresholds in response to evidence of their impacts and effectiveness.

Enforcement of any limits will also require a reasonable amount of tolerance, to allow for the imprecision of growers, and testing technology­, as discussed above. Any ­sanctions ­for threshold violations will ­also need ­to­ be ­proportionate.­ Such­ limits­ would sensibly be regarded more as a good practice guide for retailers or as a moderating influence on the potency of the products they sell. The aim should be to curb certain risky behaviours and prevent potency levels creeping up further, rather than to create a new form of prohibition that will needlessly penalise existing users or vendors in the future.

A ­different ­approach­ would­ be ­needed ­for­ edibles,­ with­ THC ­and­ CBD­ content by weight (and by standardised units if such a system is adopted) being clearly labelled on discrete single servings of any given edible product. What constitutes a single edible serving for an individual should ­be­ clearly­ defined­ and­ an­ upper­ limit ­on ­THC ­­content­ per serving (by weight or standardised units) should also be established.

The approach taken in Canada has been to establish an upper limit on THC content per 

 (i.e. the outermost package), albeit with no corresponding limit on CBD. In practical terms, this means that where there is only one discrete edible unit in a product container, that unit is limited to 10mg of THC. However, where there are four discrete units in a product container, each unit must be no more than 2.5mg of THC (and the potency of each unit must be the same, in any event). In practice, research has highlighted that consumers find it difficult to understand cannabis labelling that merely provides potency information in terms of milligrams of THC, with similar issues in relation to percentages. Effectively communicating potency information to consumers may therefore require developing an easily understandable numerical, colour-coded or traffic light-type scale as well as a standardised THC unit (see above).

There ­is ­a­ parallel ­issue­ around­ possible­ regulation­ of­ CBD content, and THC:CBD­ ratios.­ Attempting to establish an enforceable ratio limit would be even more problematic than THC content thresholds, not least as the scientific basis­ for­ judgements­ about­ the­ risks­ of­ any­ given­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ is­ not well established. For more restrictive regulatory models, it makes sense­ to ­ensure ­that ­licensed­ herbal or resin cannabis ­products­ all­ include ­a ­CBD­ ‘buffer’ — ranges of between 1-4% CBD, or a minimum 10:1 THC:CBD ratio, have been suggested as a starting point (albeit based on the limited available research). For less restrictive market models this will primarily need to be dealt with through clear product labelling, consumer education, and responsible retailing, all informed by the emerging body of knowledge on this particular question.

How to regulate cannabis potency?

The Home Office has set out its plans to reduce the current levels of recreational drug use across the UK in its new White Paper Swift, Certain, Tough: new consequences for drug possession. The paper follows on from the Government’s most recent drug strategy; it was promised at the time to address the objective of ‘demand reduction’- reducing use - which the drug strategy mostly overlooked in its focus on service provision.

The White Paper’s demand reduction strategy for ‘so-called recreational users’ proposes a model for public consultation (to be piloted in three locations) for how drug possession offences would be dealt with, summarised in this graphic:

Some elements of the proposals appear relatively promising. At first glance, there seems to be a desire to try and avoid the tens of thousands of people caught committing minor possession offences from being drawn into the criminal justice system. Implicit is an acknowledgement that criminalisation of minor possession is both expensive and counterproductive; there is no evidence that blanket punitive sanctions are an effective deterrent and there is substantive evidence that they fuel stigma, create obstacles to proven public health interventions, and undermine the life chances, particularly of people from socially and economically marginalised communities.

This is why ending criminalisation of people who use drugs is recommended best practice from the Government’s own expert advisers (the ACMD), all 31 lead agencies of the UN including The World Health Organisation and UN Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as the Royal College of Physicians, the UK Faculty of Public health, the Royal Society for Public Health - and many other authoritative voices.

United Kingdom: Reviewing the government’s new ‘tough’ consequences for drug possession

This is the third edition of our guide to regulating legal markets for the non-medical use of cannabis. It is for policy makers, reform advocates and affected communities all over the world who are seeing the legal regulation of cannabis move move from the margins devisively into the political mainstream. The question is no longer just ‘Should we maintain cannabis prohibition?’ or ‘How will legal regulation work in practice?’, but also ‘What can we learn from legalisation efforts so far?’

Since this book was first published in 2013, the cannabis policy landscape has changed dramatically, with multiple jurisdictions having developed or implemented regulated market models for the non-medical use of cannabis. Over the last decade, Transform has been approached by jurisdictions to provide its expertise as consultants to support the establishment of their new policy frameworks.

This updated and expanded new edition draws on Transform’s experience in the field, and emerging evidence from these new legal cannabis markets. It includes detailed new sections on social equity programmes, expungement of past criminal records, and mitigating the risks of corporate capture. This book will help guide those interested in cannabis policy through the key practical challenges to developing and implementing an effective regulation approach aimed at achieving a world where drug policy promotes health, protects the vulnerable and puts safety first.

How to regulate cannabis, 3rd edition

• The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 is 50 years old but has never been subject to a formal government evaluation or review.

• More than three million criminal records have been issued under the Misuse of Drugs Act, with people sentenced to more than 680,000 years in prison since 1986.

• Drug use has risen dramatically, while drugs have become cheaper, more potent and more available.

The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA) underpins all UK drug policy, establishing criminal offences for a range of activities including possession, supply and production of specified ‘controlled drugs’. It brought the UK into line with the global prohibition regime established under the UN Single Convention on Drugs of 1961 (which the UK ratified). The MDA also established the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, and set out powers for the police to stop and search individuals on suspicion of drug possession.

Over the last five decades, vast financial and police resources have been directed towards enforcement of the MDA, while drug consumption, health harms and deaths have increased dramatically. The UK’s illegal drug markets - and associated criminality - have expanded to meet this growing demand, now valued at £9 billion annually.1 Yet, despite the evidence that the MDA has strikingly failed in its primary aims of reducing drug availability, use, and health harms, this legislation has never been subject to formal government evaluation or review, and no meaningful evaluation framework has been established to report on, or scrutinize, outcomes.

This report presents a summary of key available data on which to assess the effectiveness, in terms of costs and impacts, of the UK’s Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, covering: criminalisation and incarceration; enforcement spending; drug-related deaths; prevalence of drug use; and drug availability.

Behind these statistics lie human stories: To learn how peoples’ lives have been impacted by the UK’s drug laws, please visit anyoneschild.org.

Britain's Misuse Of Drugs Act 1971: Counting the costs

Since 2013, a number of countries and local jurisdictions around the world have legalised and regulated their cannabis supply chains for non-medical use. Lawmakers, regulators, researchers, and advocates continue to design, enact, implement and revise regulatory frameworks for medical and recreational cannabis. And yet lessons from regulating other psychoactive substances, including tobacco products, are not always fully considered.

The experience of the illicit tobacco trade is particularly relevant for cannabis regulation. There are of course significant differences between the two substances. Cigarettes kill over 7 million people worldwide annually, and between one half and two thirds of their users. Non-combustible cannabis products, in contrast, present very low levels of harm, and some medical benefits. Cannabis and tobacco distribution also differ in nature. The global tobacco market is heavily concentrated. China, Brazil, and India accounted for 63% of all tobacco leaf cultivation in 2019 as part of a global cigarette market dominated by a small number of companies. China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) accounted for 43.9% of global cigarette retail volume in 2019 – the large majority of it is destined for domestic consumption, though the company has been developing a global expansion strategy. Beyond CNTC, Philip Morris International (PMI) (13.4% of global retail volume in 2019), British American Tobacco (BAT) (12.7%), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) (9.1%) and Imperial Brands (4.2%) accounted for 70% of the rest of the world’s market share in 2019. In contrast, cannabis can be grown indoors and therefore almost anywhere across the world. The illicit cannabis market has been characterised by a high number of small-scale growers, including for personal consumption and local distribution. Moreover, cigarettes are light, compact, distributed in small packs, and easy to smuggle – in part because they can be disguised as legal products through false invoicing and/or when hidden within a shipment containing other commodities. One 20-foot shipping container alone can hold almost five million cigarettes.

Yet tobacco and cannabis are both plants with psychoactive substances, with some similar characteristics including with regard to production (cultivation and processing) and consumption (tobacco and cannabis products can be smoked, consumed with a vaporiser, or used orally), and to some extent converging industries.

In any jurisdiction that regulates a psychoactive drug like tobacco or cannabis, a portion of it will remain on the illicit market. In Canada for instance, approximately half of the total cannabis market was illicit in the third quarter of 2020, almost two years after cannabis legalisation was introduced, according to expenditure data. Across the 10 Canadian provinces, legal recreational cannabis shares varied from 13% to 70% in September 2019. An estimated 10-12% of cigarettes consumed worldwide are illicit – this includes both illicit production and distribution.

Given those similarities and while the legal cannabis industry is still nascent, now is the time to explore lessons from tobacco control in order to inform cannabis regime design decisions. By tackling these questions early, governments are more likely to be able to prevent the emergence of an industry capable of preventing, deflecting and undermining policies centred on public health, social justice, inclusive and equitable trade, and human rights. The tobacco experience is arguably not a reason to refrain from regulating cannabis at all. Rather it serves as a cautionary tale of the difficulties to restrain private actors once they have become too powerful. The history of the illicit tobacco trade, and the role of the tobacco industry in both driving it and shaping responses to it, is particularly relevant in that regard. It will be the focus of this report.

Cannabis regulation: Lessons from the illicit tobacco trade

As the legal regulation of cannabis picks up momentum, ensuring that the nascent industry contributes to, rather than undermines, health, social justice and human rights goals should be at the forefront of policy discussions.

Despite clear differences, lessons from tobacco control efforts and responses by key trade actors can and should inform these important debates.

The tobacco experience is not a reason to refrain from regulating cannabis at all. Rather it serves as a ‘cautionary tale’ of the difficulties to restrain private actors once they have become too powerful.

In seeking to future-proof sustainable regulatory efforts, join us for the launch of ‘Cannabis regulation: Lessons from the illicit tobacco trade’, an illuminating briefing paper written by Benoit Gomis and produced as a collaboration between the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), the Global Drug Policy Observatory (GDPO), Health Poverty Action (HPA), Transform, the Transnational Institute (TNI) and the Washington Office on latin America (WOLA).


- Ann Fordham, Executive Director, IDPC.
- Benoît Gomis, Author and consultant on the illicit drug trade.

Cannabis regulation: Lessons from the illicit tobacco trade - Publication launch

The publication of the second phase of Dame Carol Black’s Independent Review of Drugs will, hopefully, mark a sea-change in approaches to treatment in this country. The report pulls no punches in describing the extent to which funding has been slashed in recent years, and it makes a call for an additional £550 million to be allocated to treatment over the next five years - bringing spending back to 2012 levels. Though even if the UK Government does agree to this additional funding - and we sincerely hope they do - it is worth comparing with the Scottish Government’s commitment to an additional £250 million over the same time period, for a much smaller population.

The report also calls for an overhaul of quality oversight, commissioning models and workforce development. All of which are urgently needed. The drug (and alcohol) treatment sector has been shamefully neglected in recent years, contributing to the appalling increases in drug-related deaths that we have witnessed over the same period. Carol Black is clearly committed to addressing the problems in the sector, and to improving the lives and prospects of those who need support for drug-related problems.

However, the report is disappointing in other respects. Unlike the Phase 1 review, which laid out in forensic detail the scale and impact of drug markets, this review is light on the evidence it brings to bear. It notes that key, evidence-based approaches such as Housing First are vital to holistic treatment approaches, but while calling for expansion of this model the body of the report, Housing First doesn’t make it into the actual recommendations.

England - Black review: Strong on treatment, but avoids law reform

Suzanne Sharkey used to arrest drug users, then she became one. She worked as an undercover officer for Northumbria Police in the 1990s, and was "very happy" locking up users and dealers. "I joined the police because of what they stood for - reducing crime, protecting communities and locking up 'the baddies'," she said.

"But I ended up a 24/7 alcoholic and I used drugs. I was in recovery and I looked around at the people there with me, and one of the biggest barriers I saw to their recovery were drug laws. The criminalisation closed so many doors for them that they couldn't move on with their lives."

Now she is one of those calling for drug policy reform as co-executive director of the Law Enforcement Action Partnership, an activist group made up of current and former justice sector workers.

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