Accra, Ghana, was recently host to a visionary conference on the future of cannabis in the country. The event, organised by 

the International Drug Policy Consortium,

, brought together over 50 participants from the drug policy reform and economic justice sectors, policymakers and cannabis farmers across Ghana.

The two-day conference on 25 - 26 April titled “

An Equitable Roadmap for the Legal Regulation of Cannabis in Ghana that Protects Livelihoods and Supports Sustainable Development

” sought to explore drug policy reform beyond the Narcotics Act 1019 (2020) and look towards establishing a shared, equitable vision for the legal regulation of medical and adult-use cannabis.

Three key areas were addressed: the historical and current harms caused by prohibition; the significant risks of international corporate capture of future legal trade; and, the opportunities of legal regulation to prioritise social and economic justice and achieve a sustainable transition for those working in the trade.

Through participatory and cross-sector workshops, participants were invited to envision models of legal regulation for industrial hemp, medical and adult-use cannabis using 

Health Poverty Action’s Social Justice Lens

. The models of regulation developed sought to address the harms of prohibition and strengthen a wide range of social justice areas, such as governance, public health, environmental protection and human rights.

The models of regulation developed sought to address the harms of prohibition and strengthen a wide range of social justice areas, such as governance, public health, environmental protection and human rights.

This process culminated in a draft vision presented to policymakers on day two. The vision highlighted some clear shared goals, notably in relation to gender equality, avoiding corporate capture and progressive taxation. Participants strongly highlighted the gender dimension, with farmers proposing that the market regulations adopt a gender-sensitive approach to address the issues of disproportionate harm and exclusion experienced by women under prohibition, as well as the lack of comprehensive childcare for agricultural workers. Many suggested that the revenues raised from taxes from the new cannabis market should support the provision of childcare, removing barriers in women's access to stable livelihoods in farming.

They also called for the legal market to be equitably taxed, and for measures to be implemented to impede the diversion of fiscal revenue into tax havens. In the same vein, participants called for the reinvestment of taxation into serving national and community needs, particularly public health and harm reduction programmes.

Participants learnt about a range of legal regulatory models being used around the world, all with particular priorities and unique results. Dasheeda Dawson

Founding Director of Cannabis NYC, delivered a special report on day two, inspiring stakeholders with the community-led campaign for social and restorative justice at the heart of New York's cannabis reforms.

The meeting was the first of its kind in West Africa to bring together the expertise and knowledge of Ghanaian trade unionists and economic justice experts with the drug policy community. Participants learnt about other trades in Ghana, such as cashew, biofuel and cocoa, that have all been captured by oppressive and harmful tactics of exploitation from international foreign corporations. A key question voiced loud and clear was whether Ghana would continue its colonial mandate and legacy of producing raw materials for the metropole or could cannabis rewrite the textbook?

A key question voiced loud and clear was whether Ghana would continue its colonial mandate and legacy of producing raw materials for the metropole or could cannabis rewrite the textbook?

To ensure that economic justice is at the heart of any new legal framework for cannabis, measures must be put in place to prevent commercialisation and corporate monopolisation. Our economic justice colleagues urged farmers and civil society to organise themselves into associations and trade unions. Whether these unions should be specific to cannabis or join existing agricultural unions was a critical question to be given further attention. There was strong support for stakeholders to be better equipped with knowledge on how corporations behave and a commitment to continue working on a shared vision of future markets through more intersectoral meetings. After a comprehensive presentation on 

 from Steve Rolles, Senior Policy Analyst from 

 participants explored what cannabis corporation ‘takeovers’ might look like and what to anticipate and avoid.

Working on a shared vision helped farmers and civil society to identify risks that regulation might bring about. These were mainly the possibility of new markets facilitating land grabbing and eroding food security for the poorest communities. With an incoming climate crisis farmers agreed that Ghana must not find itself in a situation of planting more cannabis than food, and that sustainable farming methods and environmental safeguards must be prioritised in regulation.

Farmers felt that to ensure local farmers' participation, there is a need for transparency and accountability from the start by considering the inclusion of local content and standardisation in the certification process as it develops, not after. Most farmers believed it is critical to prevent the emergence of foreign or domestic corporate monopolies and use licensing to ensure the market prioritises small and medium-sized businesses.

Feedback from policymakers indicated that the workshop was timely and valuable, Many noted it was a relief to discuss the impacts of cannabis regulation from so many viewpoints and intersections in a non-judgemental space. This allowed everyone to approach the subject through common sense and logical perspective rather than from their specific area of expertise.

Almost all participants concluded that drug policy reform in Ghana must be addressed through multi-sector meetings like these, which allow for a diverse conversation. There was a strong consensus that prohibition was harming communities and an emphasis on seeking ways to avoid repeating the mistakes of other trades that have prioritised big business over people.

There was a strong consensus that prohibition was harming communities and an emphasis on seeking ways to avoid repeating the mistakes of other trades that have prioritised big business over people.

 in Ghana and paved the way for a multi-stakeholder journey towards legal regulation that protects livelihoods and supports sustainable development.

The meeting was made possible with financial support from Health Poverty Action.

Envisioning equitable cannabis reform in Ghana 

Europe’s heroin market could soon be in for a supply shock, and experts fear the gap could be filled by something much worse.

Almost all heroin consumed in Europe comes from Afghanistan, where the Taliban have imposed a ban on poppy cultivation that will take effect in the coming weeks.

The likely poppy shortage could make it more profitable for criminals to manufacture synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, to be sold to "desperate addicts" denied their hit of heroin.

That in turn presents a serious public health risk, as synthetic opioids tend to be much stronger than natural heroin — 

 in the case of fentanyl. That means it’s much easier to 

The Taliban banned poppy cultivation in April 2022, after wresting back control of Afghanistan from the US-backed government in 2021. The 2022 crop was exempted, meaning the results will start to be seen with this year's April harvest. It takes between 

 for the harvest to reach the European market as heroin, giving governments until next year before the impact starts to be felt.

“If the Taliban ban does result in a dramatic reduction in heroin produced from opium poppy, that could create a possibility of us seeing more synthetic opioids," said Paul Griffiths, scientific director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).

Taliban poppy ban puts Europe on fentanyl alert

Land use and control, combined with prohibition, is the fundamental motor driving environmental harm relating to production and sales of illicit drugs, as previous parts of this series 

. Yet even eliminating illicit drugs, an impossibility, would not protect habitats that are systematically destroyed when they are turned over—officially, or effectively—to miners, cattle ranchers, developers, fossil fuel extraction companies or electricity plants.

Indigenous land defenders’ struggle to wrest back control of land

from both illicit actors (like drug trafficking organizations or wildcat, “artisanal” miners) and, increasingly and usually more significantly, legal or nominally legal ones

difficult, dangerous and terribly lopsided battle

Perhaps, as Guatemalan ecological activist Julio González 

, it is inevitable that people living in relative harmony with environmentally and culturally significant land will be pushed too far by those seeking to extract profit at any cost, and armed conflict will (continue to) erupt around the world.

But land defenders continue to pursue new avenues to end impunity for the destruction of irreplaceable ecological heritage and ways of life.

Environmental ruin, aided by drug war: How can defenders fight back?

 details how coca cultivation soared 35 per cent from 2020 to 2021, a record high and the sharpest year-to-year increase since 2016. The rise is a result of both an expansion in coca bush cultivation and improvements in the process of converting coca bush to cocaine hydrochloride. 

The steep growth in supply has been matched by a similar swelling in demand, with many regions showing a steady rise in cocaine users over the past decade. While the cocaine market remains quite concentrated in the Americas and parts of Europe, the report warns that there is a strong potential for a large expansion in Africa and Asia.

Nevertheless, interceptions of cocaine shipments by law enforcement around the world have also risen sharply, with seizures reaching a record high of nearly 2,000 tons in 2021.

UNODC Global Report on Cocaine 2023

A deadly crackdown on political protests in Peru continues, as President Dina Boluarte tries to silence calls for her to resign, and Congress resists demands for new elections this year. Drowned out by the current crisis, which followed the ousting of President Pedro Castillo, is how Peruvians have lost any potential for drug policy reform—in a country where coca is produced in large quanties, and which is almost entirely without sanctioned harm reduction.

Castillo, a school teacher originally from a rural town in the northern Cajamarca region, gained national prominence for his union leadership in a 2017 teachers’ strike. Running in the 2021 presidential election on a leftist platform with the Free Peru party, he won the first round and ultimately achieved a narrow run-off victory over Keiko Fujimori—a right-wing congress member and daughter of former president and dictator Alberto Fujimori.

Peru's coca reform chance disappears amid political crisis

The pungent aroma of cannabis and the sound of dub music fill the air at a hacienda as about 150 smokers, users, growers, activists and business people gather for Mexico’s second annual Toquefest.

 – after a number of supreme court decisions 

 and deemed unconstitutional the ban on recreational use – the war on weed in Mexico is winding down and the festival is just one of 20 marijuana-related events being held 

Cannabis growers feel increasingly confident in going public and some farmers are switching crops to 

: a gram of which can be sold for more than several kilos of black beans.

“This is another revolution,” says Isidro Cisneros, a grower from the town of Cuautlixco in the state of Morelos where the Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata was born. “It’s about land and freedom, and a plant that has been criminalised for years without good reason. Growing cannabis, peasants can live and eat well.”

‘This is another revolution’: Could legalisation of cannabis transform Mexico’s economy?

A research study on Afghan Women and the Opiate Trade was launched by the Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP) at CRIMJUST, Border Management Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The report provides a unique insight into the role of Afghan women in the opiate trade in Afghanistan.

For nearly two decades, Afghanistan has been the major source of the world’s illicit opium production. Opiates produced in Afghanistan impact governance and economic development and continue to fuel insurgency, terrorism, corruption and poor health, within Afghanistan, the southwest Asia region and further afield. The trafficking of illicit opiates contributes to the destabilization of Afghanistan and countries along the main trafficking routes. While there has been considerable research on opiate production in Afghanistan, there are few detailed studies on how opiate manufacture or trafficking occurs in Afghanistan, and no dedicated study on women’s involvement in these areas. In 2020, UNODC produced a study based on interviews with active male Afghan drug traffickers – Quchaqbar in Dari/Farsi – who were directly involved in the trafficking of opiates in Afghanistan and abroad. All of those interviewed in the 2020 study were men. Accessing women traffickers – or Quchaqbar zan in Dari- in the cultural environment of Afghanistan was challenging, and the initial assumption was that women had little role to play in the opiate trade, beyond cultivating and harvesting opium and anecdotal evidence of female drug mules. However, in the 2020 study, many male traffickers commented that Afghan women’s involvement in the opiate trade had increased in the five years from 2015 to 2020, and that women performed many roles in the business.

To better understand the role of Afghan women in opiate trade in Afghanistan the UNODC’s Afghan Opiate Trade Project, under the framework of CRIMJUST initiated the current study, based on the data gathered from nine interviews with Afghan female traffickers. The study investigates Afghan women's role and involvement in the drug trade, motivations for entering and remaining in the drug trade, the business model and drug trafficking networks.

Mapping criminal networks is essential to understanding the illicit opiate trade, both within Afghanistan and internationally

” – emphasized Alan Cole, the Chief of the Border Management Branch at the launch of the research study in Vienna.

According to the research study, Afghan women are involved in a wide range of roles within the illicit opiate trade, including trafficking outside Afghanistan and selling heroin to users. Having entered the drug trade for a combination of social and economic motives, the women remained involved mostly for financial reasons. They directly managed the income earned from the opiate trade and used it primarily on family expenses and savings. Often working within family-based drug trafficking organisations, the women remained at the periphery of the wider organization due to social restrictions and cultural norms. Some women had left the opiate trade following the return to power by the Taliban – conversely, some women reported that trafficking had become easier.
"O

piates are cultivated in areas where there is less gender equality

", stated Ms. Alison Davidian, Country Representative for UN Women in Afghanistan. She stressed that the broader cultural context must be taken into consideration when designing policies targeting women in Afghanistan.

This is the first study to understand opiate trafficking from the perspective of Afghan women. Their testimonies provide novel insight into an otherwise hidden population. Not only does this report contribute to wider research on the topic of women’s involvement in drug trafficking, it also provides an evidence base upon which targeted interventions to help women leave the opiate trade can be developed.

Afghan women and the opiate trade

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ministry of Justice and Law present the monitoring report on territories affected by coca cultivation as of 31 December 2021, prepared by the Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI).

The first chapter highlights that potential cocaine production maintains the upward trend that has been registered since 2014, while the area planted with coca resumes the strong upward trend that had been present since 2014 and that was interrupted between 2018 and 2020. It indicates that this recovery of the trend is the result of the interaction of multiple structural factors that coincided with a reduction in the efficiency of interventions.

In contrast to the 2018-2020 period, coca did not only grow within the productive enclaves, as the increase was generalised; even departments that were showing a downward trend, such as Caquetá, Meta and Guaviare, showed an increase in coca cultivation. The consolidation of coca-free territories has not yet taken place, despite the fact that five departments have now had less than 100 hectares under cultivation for more than nine years.

The second chapter emphasises elements of change that boost the incentive system and can have an impact on the reactivation of the phenomenon in territories that had a tendency to abandon coca cultivation. These changes do not only affect coca growers; they also have an impact on the communities that interact with the production chain. The report highlights the changes in the roles and actors of power present in the territories, the new urban-rural relations that imply new alternatives for transforming illegal profits into goods and services, as well as the formation of productive enclaves not only related to the concentration and permanence of coca, but also to the development of other enclave characteristics in an economic sense.

Colombia - Monitoring of territories affected by illicit crops 2021

Recent cannabis debates have thrust the issue of cannabis potency back into the limelight. From UK calls to put cannabis in Class A because of rising potency and health harms, to leaked proposals from Germany to cap retail cannabis potency at 15% THC in their soon to be legalised market - the issue remains clouded with misunderstandings. Below is an edited excerpt from Transform's newly updated 3rd edition of 'How To Regulate Cannabis: A Practical Guide' that explores the potency issue; what does potency actually mean, how does it impact on cannabis related risks, and how can it be sensibly regulated?

There is a certain amount of confusion around the concept of cannabis potency­ — both ­what ­it ­means­ in ­technical ­terms,­ and ­what ­its ­implications­ are for the risks associated with the use of different cannabis products consumed in different ways. People are familiar with the concept of alcohol strength, expressed in percentage of alcohol content, and how this relates directly to the effects and risks of how much they consume. Standardised alcohol units are a good example. Key to their utility is that they can be readily translated between different alcohol products. However, the situation is less straightforward with cannabis, and cannot be directly compared for a number of reasons.

Cannabis potency is usually measured in terms of the percentage of its key psychoactive ingredient, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC or simply­ THC),­ but ­THC­ is ­only­ one ­of ­over­ 80 ­different ­cannabinoids­ found­ in ­the ­cannabis ­plant, ­key ­among ­these ­being ­cannabidiol ­(CBD).­ Because ­CBD­ interacts ­with ­and­ modifies ­the ­effects ­of ­THC,­ the ­ratio­ of the two is important not only as it shapes the nature of the subjective cannabis­ experience ­(CBD­ is­ thought­ to ­have ­a ­more­ sedative/calming ­effect), ­but­ also­ because­ CBD­ is­ thought­ to­ have ­anti-psychotic­ properties, ­potentially­ reducing the risks of psychotic episodes or psychotic illness related to cannabis use. The many other cannabinoids present in cannabis are less well understood but their relative proportions may also have subtle influences on the variable effects (and possibly risks) of different strains.

Lower-strength,­ outdoor-grown ­cannabis­ tends­ to­ be ­less­ than­ 10%­ THC,­ while (more commonly) indoor-grown, ‘premium’ cannabis varieties are predominantly in the­ 10-25% ­range.­ The­ potency ­of­ lower-quality ­and ­premium-grade­ resin has historically been roughly the same as this in European markets (but notably rising in recent years), although newer techniques such as solvent or carbon dioxide extractions have­ produced ­oils ­and­ other­ concentrates­, such ­as ­butane ­hash ­oil ­(BHO,­ the semi-solid forms sometimes known as ‘wax’ or ‘glass’)­, that­ have­ extremely ­high­ potencies,­ some­ reaching ­concentrations ­of­ over ­80%­ THC.

Another factor that complicates our understanding of cannabis potency is­ that­ the­ level­ of ­intoxication­ and­ the­ speed­ of­ onset ­of­ effects­, which­ will­ determine ­the ­subjective­ experience,­ depend ­in ­large­ part­ on­ the­ particular preparation, method of consumption, and using behaviours.

A ­given­ amount ­of­ cannabis ­can ­be­ smoked (or vaporised) ­in ­different­ ways­, in ­terms­ of how many inhalations the user takes, how deep the inhalations are and ­how ­long­ they ­are ­held ­in­ the ­lungs­, so ­the ­amount ­of ­active ­content­ that different individuals actually absorb can vary quite considerably. With smoked or vaporised cannabis, the onset of the effects is very rapid, meaning that individuals are able to dose control relatively easily. If they have not reached the desired effect, they will continue. If they have reached it, they can stop. On this basis, potency would seem to be less of a concern for­ inhaled ­cannabis ­use­, indeed ­higher-potency ­cannabis­ could­ mean­ fewer inhalations to achieve the same effect, thereby reducing respiratory risks. However, while such ‘auto-titration’ dose control behaviour is the norm, higher-potency cannabis can still potentially lead to higher total consumption and correspondingly pose greater risks. With more potent varieties a large dose of active content can be received in a single inhalation, and the larger such individual doses are, the harder it becomes to fine tune dosage control, meaning the potential to consume more than planned or desired is increased. This is particularly the case for novice users.

This risk of consuming more than planned (with potentially negative or undesirable effects) will be amplified when the potency of the cannabis being consumed is unknown. However, this problem can be reduced or effectively eliminated in a properly regulated system in which:

Buyers ­are­ able­ to­ choose ­from ­a ­range­ of­ clearly ­labelled ­products­ of­ different potencies

Buyers­ are­ able­ to ­take­ guidance­ from ­licensed, ­trained ­vendors

There ­is ­relevant ­information ­on ­dosage,­ effects ­and ­safer ­use­ at­ point­ of sale and on all packaging

In many parts of the world, notably in Europe, smoked cannabis is also often mixed with varying proportions of tobacco, effectively diluting its potency to levels below those that would be experienced if it were smoked pure, much in the same way that alcoholic spirits can be diluted with mixers to various degrees. While this may reduce some of the above risks relating to high-potency cannabis, any benefits are probably more than outweighed by the risks associated with smoked tobacco.

The increasing average potency of illegal cannabis is a genuine observed phenomenon in the US, and to a lesser extent in Europe, although what appears to be a long-term incremental rise in average potency has provoked many exaggerated ‘reefer madness’-style claims that have little basis in reality. In Western markets at least, the increasing market dominance of indoor-grown ‘premium’ cannabis, combined with likely actual increases in its potency (through selective breeding and developments in intensive growing technologies), has probably pushed average potency up to between two to three times what it was in­ the­ 60s­ and­ 70s.­ Such­ averages­ do,­ however, disguise a great deal of variety within markets and between different localities. There was of course very potent cannabis (particularly in resin form)­ available­ in ­the ­60s­ and­ 70s, ­so ­the­ suggestion that what is being consumed today is a ‘completely different drug’ is misleading: the observed trend is primarily due to there being a greater proportion of more potent varieties on the market.

The emergence of high potency concentrates like BHO is a comparatively recent phenomenon, so relatively little is known about their prevalence and impacts, particularly outside more established medical, and now non-medical markets in North America. But aside from these concentrates, if there is some truth in the 

‘it’s not what we smoked in the 60s’

 claims, it is due to the trend towards higher ratios ­of ­THC ­to­ CBD ­in ­intensively ­farmed­ higher-potency ­cannabis — with CBD­ content ­often ­falling ­to ­near ­zero ­as ­THC­ levels ­have steadily ­crept­ up. ­This ­change ­in ­the­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ ­results ­both ­from­ selective breeding that prioritises high THC content (which commands a higher price), as well some of the newer intensive growing techniques deployed to maximise turnover from a given grow space that can reduce CBD content.

The data on increasing potency is not especially reliable (based primarily on seizures which may not necessarily be a representative sample of markets) and conclusions are widely disputed. It is certainly the case, however, that both the general trend towards increasing potency of herbal cannabis and the ­parallel­ trend ­towards­ increasing­ THC ­to ­CBD ­ratios ­are ­not ­merely­ demand-driven, but are primarily manifestations of illegal market economics. There is an echo here of how, under US alcohol prohibition, the market shifted towards stronger spirits that provided significantly higher profits per unit weight for bootleggers. When alcohol prohibition ended, the market naturally shifted back towards sales of beers and wines. In many US and European markets it is now becoming hard to obtain ­anything ­except­ the­ more­ potent­ varieties­, even­ when individuals would prefer something milder if given the choice. The same shift has yet to be shown for legal markets in North America, suggesting that economic dynamics in more commercial jurisdictions may similarly be more concerned with profit opportunities than public health concerns. This highlights the important role for regulation to play to curb these interests and ensure a careful balance, while protecting public health.

Ensuring the THC and CBD content of all retail cannabis products is routinely tested

Although potency testing and monitoring of cannabis products can be relatively expensive, a reasonable level is not an excessive burden. It is important to acknowledge that technical challenges of accurate testing have often been flagged — noting that potency can vary widely within a crop, batch or even plant (or differing challenges for testing of edibles and other preparations). But such challenges are hardly insurmountable given rapid developments in sampling and testing methodology, and realistic error margins can be built into monitoring systems and regulations.

Routine testing should be built into any regulatory framework, supported by random test purchasing, and be undertaken or commissioned independently by the regulating authorities — with cost burden covered by taxation and producer and vendor licensing fees. The intensity of testing required will become clear from levels of compliance but should err on the side of more rather than less at the outset, in order to establish clear norms and expectations for market actors. The production and in particular sale of products that diverge significantly from their stated potency should be considered a serious licence violation. Allowable error margins and penalties for violations should be clearly established. For instance, Canadian regulations establish variability limits of 15-25% above or below the stated levels of THC and CBD depending on the type of cannabis product, and in some cases the stated potency.

Ensuring consumers are aware of the potency of all retail cannabis products — and their related risks

All retail products should be clearly labelled with potency information covering­ THC ­and ­CBD­ content.­ This ­should ­be ­supported­ with ­related­ information ­on ­risks, potentially­ with ­a­ simplified­ numerical­ (e.g.­1-5)­ strength guide. More detailed standardised information on cannabis potency and related risks should also be made prominently available at point of sale in all retail outlets. Vendors should be trained to give advice on potency and related risk issues.

Controlling the potency of retail products

Having an upper limit on the THC content of retail herbal or resin/oil cannabis for non-medical use could be seen as a sensible precautionary measure, but is problematic for a number of reasons, particularly in a more ­open ­market­ model. ­Beyond ­what­ many­ consumers ­may ­view ­as­ an unfair or unnecessary imposition, the obvious practical issues are exactly where such a threshold would be set and how it could be enforced.

In­ 2012 ­the ­Dutch­ government­ proposed­ a ­prohibition ­on ­sales ­of ­herbal­ cannabis ­over ­15%­ THC, ­although ­this­ move was not approved ­and­ was opposed by almost every government office (including the police, prosecution, and forensic service) that would be involved in enforcing the limit. Research into the proposal suggested that, while the measure could “in theory [provide] a slight health benefit for specific groups of cannabis users (i.e., frequent users preferring strong cannabis…)” in practice it reflected a “political choice and based on thin evidence”. The New Zealand 2020 draft Cannabis Legalisation and Control Bill proposed similar potency limits, promoted as a key way that regulation could take back control of the market and facilitate harm reduction aims. This highlights how such measures continue to be politically useful, even in lieu of evidence as to their practical impact.

Even if most consumers are unlikely to be concerned by an upper limit at or near this level (which would still be considered at least adequately strong herbal cannabis by most) the fact is that any such limit is inevitably quite arbitrary, and as such could lead to arbitrary enforcement outcomes. This is especially the case given the improving but still imperfect nature of both potency control among growers (even with the most carefully cultivated cannabis there will be a certain amount of potency variation between crops, and even within any given crop or sample) and potency testing technology.

If the aim is to encourage the use of lower-potency products as a way of moderating risks, then a more sensible approach would appear to be a combination of:

Strict product testing and labelling requirements that ensure buyers know exactly what they are consuming, enabling them to make informed choices

Consumer­ education­ about­ potency-related­ issues/risks,­ supported ­by­ packaging and point of sale info, and training requirements for vendors

Responsible ­retailing, ­which ­could ­be­ encouraged­ through ­licensing­ requirements for vendor training in how to provide potency and risk advice to purchasers

Variable ­tax ­rates (or other price controls), ­which ­could­ be ­employed ­in­ order ­to­ encourage­ the­ use of less potent products, as is done with alcohol in many countries

If limiting the potency of retail cannabis under a relatively open market model is problematic, under a more regulated market model such as that found in Uruguay it is less of a challenge, as the regulatory authorities license producers to provide the specified products that will be available for sale. Even in this more restricted scenario, cannabis ‘connoisseurs’, or those who desire higher-potency strains, can still be catered for either by provisions on home growing or cannabis social clubs.

Restrictions on sales of high-potency concentrates are a more reasonable proposition if such products are shown to be associated with significantly increased risks, but again such restrictions face the challenges of where any potency threshold should be drawn and how it would be enforced. Such decisions will be significantly shaped by the nature of existing demand and patterns of use. Certainly if there is little or no existing demand for high-potency concentrates, establishing a new framework for making them legally available is likely to be something regulators will naturally want to avoid (advocates for medical cannabis access have made the case that concentrates may have specific medical utility - but such availability is lilely to be via a different regulatory medical channel).

However, given the fast-rising popularity of concentrates in certain regions (particularly North America), prohibiting options for retail access where demand is already established would likely push many consumers back to the illegal market. In US states without regulated non-medical markets, 15% of cannabis consumers report using concentrates within the past 12 months (compared to 22% in legalising states). Legal access to concentrates could be provided instead through membership-based cannabis social clubs, although this could lead to difficulties regulating safe production practices. Some of the newer production techniques for concentrates (such as CO2 and butane extractions) are quite dangerous in inexperienced hands, so licensed production and availability is probably preferable if the alternative is risky home production. For these reasons, the Canadian Cannabis Act and Regulations prohibit at-home butane extraction, instead reserving the right to licensed cultivators, processors, testers and researchers.

If potency threshold limits are adopted for herbal cannabis and/or resin/concentrates­, and ­it ­seems ­inevitable­ that­ some­ jurisdictions­ will ­choose­ to­ do­ so­, it­ will ­be ­important ­to ­make ­sure­ they ­are set ­high­ enough­ to­ cater­ for the large majority of existing demand in a given jurisdiction. If they are set too low it will simply create an opportunity for unlicensed producers to meet the unsatisfied demand. There will need to be constant monitoring of impacts, and the flexibility to adjust (or abandon) such thresholds in response to evidence of their impacts and effectiveness.

Enforcement of any limits will also require a reasonable amount of tolerance, to allow for the imprecision of growers, and testing technology­, as discussed above. Any ­sanctions ­for threshold violations will ­also need ­to­ be ­proportionate.­ Such­ limits­ would sensibly be regarded more as a good practice guide for retailers or as a moderating influence on the potency of the products they sell. The aim should be to curb certain risky behaviours and prevent potency levels creeping up further, rather than to create a new form of prohibition that will needlessly penalise existing users or vendors in the future.

A ­different ­approach­ would­ be ­needed ­for­ edibles,­ with­ THC ­and­ CBD­ content by weight (and by standardised units if such a system is adopted) being clearly labelled on discrete single servings of any given edible product. What constitutes a single edible serving for an individual should ­be­ clearly­ defined­ and­ an­ upper­ limit ­on ­THC ­­content­ per serving (by weight or standardised units) should also be established.

The approach taken in Canada has been to establish an upper limit on THC content per 

 (i.e. the outermost package), albeit with no corresponding limit on CBD. In practical terms, this means that where there is only one discrete edible unit in a product container, that unit is limited to 10mg of THC. However, where there are four discrete units in a product container, each unit must be no more than 2.5mg of THC (and the potency of each unit must be the same, in any event). In practice, research has highlighted that consumers find it difficult to understand cannabis labelling that merely provides potency information in terms of milligrams of THC, with similar issues in relation to percentages. Effectively communicating potency information to consumers may therefore require developing an easily understandable numerical, colour-coded or traffic light-type scale as well as a standardised THC unit (see above).

There ­is ­a­ parallel ­issue­ around­ possible­ regulation­ of­ CBD content, and THC:CBD­ ratios.­ Attempting to establish an enforceable ratio limit would be even more problematic than THC content thresholds, not least as the scientific basis­ for­ judgements­ about­ the­ risks­ of­ any­ given­ THC:CBD­ ratio­ is­ not well established. For more restrictive regulatory models, it makes sense­ to ­ensure ­that ­licensed­ herbal or resin cannabis ­products­ all­ include ­a ­CBD­ ‘buffer’ — ranges of between 1-4% CBD, or a minimum 10:1 THC:CBD ratio, have been suggested as a starting point (albeit based on the limited available research). For less restrictive market models this will primarily need to be dealt with through clear product labelling, consumer education, and responsible retailing, all informed by the emerging body of knowledge on this particular question.

How to regulate cannabis potency?

In recent years, more than a dozen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have promoted some form of regulation of the medicinal use of cannabis, following the worldwide trend of relaxing the prohibition of the plant.

Such regulations are at different stages of development and have distinct characteristics, but they are similar in their pro-profit commercial orientation, which has stimulated the structuring of a regional production and consumption chain connected to the international dynamics of this new market. According to some reports, in 2020 the global medical cannabis market was worth US$9 billion and could reach US$49 billion by 2028, with an annual growth of 24%. The Latin American medicinal cannabis market is predicted to follow the same trajectory. It is estimated that this market represented US$1.2 billion in 2022 and is expected to reach US$3.75 billion in 2027, based on the same global annual growth rate.

A growing number of transnational corporations (TNCs), especially from Canada and the US, view this new Latin American regional market as a great business opportunity. Low taxes, unprotective and undemanding labour laws, low labour costs, a favourable climate for growing cannabis, affordable land, infrastructure and inputs for the cultivation and manufacture of cannabis products have all attracted this corporate interest. Several of these corporations have made direct investments in countries across the LAC region, establishing partnerships of different types with local companies in order to obtain commercial advantages for growing cannabis at low cost to manufacture their products either for export or for expanding their consumer market.

This new context of regulations on cannabis for medicinal purposes in Latin America could be a driving force for social justice. It could guarantee a therapeutic alternative for various medical conditions, reflecting scientific research and the positive experience of patients who have used cannabis-derived products for years, particularly CBD-rich oils. It could also be an opportunity to invest in repairing some of the social harms imposed by the long period of prohibition, which focused on the repression of vulnerable social groups involved in the production, commercialisation and consumption of cannabis, and led to incarceration, exclusion, deepening inequalities, corruption, and the like.

Corporate capture of the Latin American medical cannabis market

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s push for a major overhaul of the “war on drugs” is likely to cause tensions with Washington, but both sides appear to be proceeding with caution. Like its predecessors, the Biden Administration is reluctant to acknowledge the failure of the old tactics, but the burden will be on Petro to make the case that new approaches will work better.

Colombia has agreed with the United States on drug policies since the 1970s, with a focus on the Colombian Police and, later, the National Army. In 1996, the U.S. State Department said that the 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

 (FARC) were directly engaged in narco-trafficking, which opened the door for deeper cooperation. With “Plan Colombia” in the 2000s, Bogotá made the war on drugs a central element of its counterinsurgency – and Washington became deeply involved despite the implications for human rights in affected regions.

The two countries put aerial eradication of coca crops and extradition of traffickers at the center of the relationship, even though the initiatives did not significantly reduce the production or flows of the narcotic into the United States. The cartels fragmented and grew more violent as they fought for control of the trade.

President Petro’s proposed reform is not the first challenge to the decades-old approach. A peace agreement between President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in 2016 challenged the nature and depth of cooperation. The accord included commitments in four areas: incentivizing coca growers to change crops (through agrarian reform and secure access to markets); stopping the traffic (through interdiction); eliminating money-laundering; and getting transit and consumer countries to do more to reduce demand. The goal was to reduce the trade and demand more than to criminalize the production of raw material.

Colombia: Will new drug policies damage U.S. ties?

On the 27th of July 2022, the Supreme Court of Ghana gave a narrow judgement on a case brought before it, challenging the constitutionality of section 43 of the Narcotics Control Commission Act, which would have enabled the provision of licenses for medical cannabis cultivation.

This decision comes as a surprise as the Narcotics Control Commission Act had legalised the cultivation of cannabis for medical purposes just in 2020, repealing the previous Narcotics Drugs Act of 1990.

The plaintiff, Ezuame Mannan, made the case that the procedure that led to the adoption of the amendment for Section 43 that enabled the cultivation of medical cannabis had been wrongly adopted. Section 43 of the Narcotics Control Commission Act of 2020 (Act 1019) states that a Minister “may grant a licence for the cultivation of cannabis which has not more than 0.3% THC content on a dry weight basis for industrial purposes for obtaining fibre or seed or for medicinal purposes”.

However, a closer inspection to the Supreme Court’s decision revealed that something more nuanced had happened. Maria-Goretti Loglo, Africa Consultant for the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) provided more details on the case, explained to TalkingDrugs that the Supreme Court’s decision was grounded on the unconstitutional way that the medical cannabis amendment had been proposed.

Cultivation of crops deemed illicit