 by the people of Jamaica, particularly traditional ganja farmers. The amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Act meant that a local market remains prohibited, with only possession decriminalised.

Due to Jamaica’s reliance on international order, the CLA has struggled to take further action, creating tension with traditional farmers in Jamaica who have grown frustrated at the lack of a legal market to sell their product. Canadian cannabis companies are now 

exporting cannabis back into Jamaica and undercutting the local market.

 Due to economic and legal restrictions faced by local farmers in Jamaica, they cannot export their own product into Canada. Therefore, the legal market is inaccessible, forcing Jamaicans to rely on the illicit cannabis trade, perpetuating the criminal divide between those that can afford to access the legal market, and those that cannot.

Western policies dictating international regulations are not new within the Americas and the Caribbean. When policy is implemented without addressing this history, Western interests tend to dominate. As Vicki Hanson, a member of the 

changes were first introduced and established on premises of discrimination and prejudice toward certain culture and people on a colonial basis.”

And so, how do we go about breaking this cycle? The move towards legalisation may seem ideal, but in practice legal reform risks perpetuating racial capitalism and inequalities created by the global economy rather 

than strengthening the advancement of reparative racial justice.

 Within Jamaica, the government has attempted to widen the market for the inclusion of tradition farmers. This includes 

 and eased security requirements needed for legal cultivations.

2020 review of the International Drug Treaty,

 Jamaica openly advocated for further cannabis reform, stating: 

“the current international drug control architecture does not allow to address national realities and unique circumstances, but it is also at the core of discussions on criminal justice reforms and human rights, in particular freedom of religion is here.”

 However, this alone is not enough, as policies introduced for drug reform must construct a new world rather than solely address the damage created by the current one. Unless reparative justice is at the core of drug policy, we risk advancing racial disparity instead of counteracting it.

We must also question why Western drug policies, which are not fit for purpose for countries with traditional or indigenous use of controlled drugs, are enforced upon communities with long-standing connections with cannabis. Take for example, profitable Western security measures, such as the required implementation of 

 are consistently prioritised over factors more beneficial to local farmers, such as the importance of community cohesion and geographical location. Why is cannabis policy measured on the “global politics of ganja”, when those who view the drug as a traditional sacrament to their beliefs are given no voice?

To move forward in a manner that challenges these racial hierarchies, we must rethink how to implement drug policy: transitioning from if to how. We must make an active effort to correct the historical wrongs perpetuated by the War on Drugs, understanding the 

 that the global drugs industry has brought together, and the laws and policies that have kept this in place.

Jamaican cannabis struggles to integrate traditional growers

from David Mansfield, the leading expert in the field, suggests that the ban on opium threatened last year by the Taliban has come to pass, and there is an estimated 80%+ reduction in Afghan opium production - which supplies some 95% of the European heroin market.

What are the implications of this opium ban for Afghanistan and the region; for global opium and heroin production, and for UK policy?

We outline three possible scenarios that could come out of recent developments in Afghanistan and put forward proposals for preparedness and risk mitigation.

 Opium ban is sustained, production is displaced to other regions

 Opium ban is sustained, displaced production does not meet demand, and synthetic opioids (and other drugs) fill the market void

Taliban opium ban: What the future holds

The position paper “Drug Policy in Colombia – The Road to a Just Regulation" presents the dynamics which have maintained Colombia hostage as the longest running, and most evident examples, of failed prohibitionist drug policies. The position paper explores the context leading to the 2016 Peace Agreement, as well as the shifts in political power that resulted in uneven and unsuccessful implementation efforts of the Agreement. It puts forward recommendations to support effective and humane drug policy reforms that enhance peace, health, security and development in Colombia.

Drug policy in Colombia: The road to a just regulation

Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s push for a major overhaul of the “war on drugs” is likely to cause tensions with Washington, but both sides appear to be proceeding with caution. Like its predecessors, the Biden Administration is reluctant to acknowledge the failure of the old tactics, but the burden will be on Petro to make the case that new approaches will work better.

Colombia has agreed with the United States on drug policies since the 1970s, with a focus on the Colombian Police and, later, the National Army. In 1996, the U.S. State Department said that the 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

 (FARC) were directly engaged in narco-trafficking, which opened the door for deeper cooperation. With “Plan Colombia” in the 2000s, Bogotá made the war on drugs a central element of its counterinsurgency – and Washington became deeply involved despite the implications for human rights in affected regions.

The two countries put aerial eradication of coca crops and extradition of traffickers at the center of the relationship, even though the initiatives did not significantly reduce the production or flows of the narcotic into the United States. The cartels fragmented and grew more violent as they fought for control of the trade.

President Petro’s proposed reform is not the first challenge to the decades-old approach. A peace agreement between President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in 2016 challenged the nature and depth of cooperation. The accord included commitments in four areas: incentivizing coca growers to change crops (through agrarian reform and secure access to markets); stopping the traffic (through interdiction); eliminating money-laundering; and getting transit and consumer countries to do more to reduce demand. The goal was to reduce the trade and demand more than to criminalize the production of raw material.

Colombia: Will new drug policies damage U.S. ties?

Across the world, the state of environmental stress is unprecedented. As scholarship and activism on ‘environmental justice’ point out, poorer and marginalised communities face particular exposure to environmental harms.

This holds especially true for populations in the Global South, including Myanmar. The role of opium cultivation in relation to these environmental stresses is an underexplored terrain. Yet, as this new TNI report argues, drugs, as well as the policy responses to them, are an environmental crisis in Myanmar as well as other countries where opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants are cultivated.

Across the world, the state of environmental stress is unprecedented. This includes major threats to the lands, soils, waters, forests, and oceans that make up our ecosystems and biodiverse nature. Cutting across all of this are the unfolding effects of climate change and global heating. All of these developments will continue to have dramatic impacts on both people and planet. These impacts are however not evenly distributed. As scholarship and activism on ‘environmental justice’ points out, poorer and marginalised communities, often differentiated along class, gender and racial lines, face particular exposure to environmental harms. This holds particularly true for populations in the Global South.

The role of illicit drugs in relation to these environmental stresses is an underexplored terrain. Yet, as this report will argue, drugs, as well as the policy responses to them, are an environmental issue. This disconnect between drug and environmental policy is the result largely of the institutional compartmentalisation of the issue of drugs into the domain of crime and law enforcement with little outreach to other spheres related to the environment or sustainable development. References to the environment within drug policy have as such remained sparse and limited in scope.

This is slowly changing. A resolution on alternative development adopted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) - the central drug policy-making body within the UN system - in March this year gave special attention to environmental protection, encouraging “Member States to examine and address, within the efforts of alternative development, the harmful impact of the illicit cultivation of crops used for the production of narcotic drugs on the environment, which may lead to deforestation and the pollution of soil and water, and to seize the opportunities offered by alternative development with regard to the conservation and sustainable use of the environment and the protection of biodiversity”. And for the first time this year, the 2022 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report will include a special booklet on the connection between illicit drugs and the environment. This follows on from an increasing number of official side-events that have been organised in recent years at the CND in Vienna on the issue of drugs and the environment.

TNI’s latest report ‘Prohibited Plants. Environmental Justice in Drug Policy’ explores, among other things, the environmental dynamics associated with opium poppy cultivation in the two regions with which it is most associated: Myanmar (as part of the so-called ‘Golden Triangle’ along with Thailand and Laos) and Afghanistan. The two cases make for an interesting contrast. While in the case of Myanmar, more traditional forms of cultivation practised by upland populations and ethnic minority groups as part of mobile agricultural systems are examined, in Afghanistan the environmental implications of the introduction of new ‘green’ technologies in the form of solar-powered deepwater wells for long-term sustainability are discussed. In both cases, opium cultivation has continued, if not dramatically increased, against the backdrop of a series of bans and, with few exceptions, failed crop-substitution and alternative development (AD) programmes.

Opium cultivation and environmental justice in Myanmar

By Marie Nougier and Adria Cots Fernandez (IDPC) / Harm Reduction Consortium

The Global Drug Policy Index is a unique tool that documents, measures and compares national-level drug policies, providing each country with a score and ranking that shows how much their drug policies and their implementation align with the UN principles of human rights, health and development. As such, the Index provides an essential accountability and evaluation mechanism in the field of drug policy. It is composed of 75 indicators running across 5 broad dimensions of drug policy. This first iteration evaluates the performance of 30 countries covering all regions of the world.

Key takeaways from the Global Drug Policy Index

The global dominance of drug policies based on repression and punishment has led to low scores overall, with a median score of just 48/100, and the top-ranking country (Norway) only reaching 74/100.

Standards and expectations from civil society experts on drug policy implementation vary from country to country.

Inequality is deeply seated in global drug policies, with the top-ranking 5 countries scoring 3 times as much as the lowest-ranking 5 countries. This is in part due to the colonial legacy of the ‘war on drugs’ approach.

Drug policies are inherently complex: a country’s performance in the Index can only be fully understood by looking across and within each of the dimensions.

Drug policies disproportionately affect people marginalised on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and socio-economic status.

There are wide disparities between state policies and how they are implemented on the ground.

With a few exceptions, the meaningful participation of civil society and affected communities in drug policy processes remains severely limited.

The Global Drug Policy Index is a project of the Harm Reduction Consortium, which includes the following partners: the European Network of People Who Use Drugs (EuroNPUD), the Eurasian Harm Reduction Association (EHRA), the Eurasian Network of People who Use Drugs (ENPUD), the Global Drug Policy Observatory (GDPO) / Swansea University, Harm Reduction International (HRI), the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), the Middle East and North Africa Harm Reduction Association (MENAHRA), the West African Drug Policy Network (WADPN), the Women and Harm Reduction International Network (WHRIN), and Youth RISE.

The Global Drug Policy Index 2021 - Analytical report

From the early days of cannabis prohibition, traditional producing countries have stressed the importance of finding alternative livelihoods for rural communities dependent on cannabis cultivation. The first crop-substitution projects in the 1960s in Lebanon and Morocco were the genesis of continuing UN debate on ‘alternative development’ and ‘shared responsibility’. Growing demand for cannabis in the North and crashing prices of agricultural commodities like coffee, cocoa and banana due to free trade policies, turned the ever-expanding illegal cannabis market into a survival economy for millions of people. Almost no-where have small cannabis farmers been offered substantial development assistance for moving out of the illegal market.

The recent wave of policy changes and fast-growing legal spaces in the medical cannabis market offer new opportunities for small farmers to transition out of illegality while continuing to grow cannabis. Several traditional producing countries have started to explore this option of ‘alternative development with cannabis’. Barriers to entry, however, are not easy to overcome and few small farmers have been able thus far to conquer some space in the billion-dollar medical cannabis market. The emerging legal markets are increasingly captured by big corporations, pushing out small farmers from the South. This report argues that lessening the barriers for small farmers while raising them for large companies can help to steer legal cannabis markets in a more sustainable and equitable direction based on principles of community empowerment, social justice, fair(er) trade and sustainable development.

A sustainable future for cannabis farmers ‘alternative development’ opportunities in the legal cannabis market

By The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

The illegal cultivation of the drug crops coca and opium poppy has increased sharply over the past ten years. In 2019, coca cultivation reached an all-time high of 244,200 hectares. Furthermore, the production of the coca and opium-poppy based drugs cocaine and heroin is continuously at a high level. It is estimated that 1,723 tonnes of cocaine were produced across the globe in 2018, and 472–722 tonnes of heroin in 2019. In the European Union (EU) and also in Germany, more cocaine was seized than ever before. In 2018, an estimated 269 million people consumed illegal drugs, of whom 30 million people used opiates and 19 million cocaine.

The main cultivation areas of opium poppy are mainly located in remote rural areas of Afghanistan, Myanmar, Mexico and Laos. There are also smaller areas in Colombia and Guatemala. Coca cultivation is concentrated in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.

Illicit drug crop cultivation, drug trade and consumption are global phenomena. However, the harmful consequences of the drug economy hit the countries of the Global South particularly hard and have a deep impact on the social structures. According to data from 2017-2018, between 605,000 and 970,000 households worldwide illegally cultivate coca bush and opium poppy. In some regions of West Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America, entire political systems are influenced by drug cartels and thus limited in its ability to act.

Alternative development: Sustainable change through development-oriented drug policy

By Marianne Coulavin, Student - MA Program 'Policies and Practices in International Organizations', Sciences Po Grenoble*

As almost all coca leaf markets have been severely disrupted by the pandemic situation and prices have fallen, coca growers throughout the Andean region are in dire need of assistance.

Bolivia: Power struggle between the Áñez government and farmers of the Chapare region

Since the highly-contested ousting of former president Evo Morales in November, a power struggle has been taking place between the interim right-wing regime of Jeanine Áñez and coca growers, especially those in the Chapare region.

According to Kathryn Ledebur, from the Andean Information Network (AIN), the government has taken advantage of the pandemic to cut off the Chapare region, where coca farmers are known supporters of Evo Morales. This siege has resulted in fuel shortages and made growing communities unable to access the government’s aid scheme set up to mitigate some of the impacts of the COVID-19 situation. The regime’s apparent vendetta has been riposted to with protests and blockades.

The pandemic has had and continues to have a significant impact on coca growers throughout the country. Coca leaf prices have collapsed and although they are now rising, they remain worryingly low.

To make matters worse, farmers who cannot find a legal outlet for their crops are caught between a rock and a hard place, as markets are still paralysed. As mentioned above, the government has launched three emergency subsidies, but this aid is far from reaching all the families who need it.

Moreover, since the interim government took power, the policy regarding coca cultivation has changed. What used to be tolerated and even encouraged in recognition of coca’s embeddedness in the cultural and traditional practices of the region (Morales was a cocalero himself), is now stigmatised and criminalised.

Rather than proposing a comprehensive development plan, the government has vowed to resume bygone coercive practices. Quarantine rules enacted in March have led to a standby in eradication plans. And most farmers have managed to weather hardship by having recourse to their own production (most farmers grow crops other than coca). But it is extremely likely that the pandemic will have dramatic and lasting effects in the country’s growing tensions.

Colombia: Farmers trapped between eradication task forces and armed groups

Unlike Bolivia, the Colombian government has not stopped its eradication campaign while imposing lockdown restrictions. Quite the contrary. Eradication task forces conducted such operations without protective equipment, raising fears of COVID-19 infections and violating the spirit and word of the 2016 Peace Accord.

Indeed, the Accord stipulates that the eradication of illicit crops must be voluntary. These eradication operations, which are often violent, threaten the lives of farmers, destroying their main means of subsistence and food supply, and leading to gross human rights violations.

The Duque government also expected to resume aerial spraying of glyphosate on coca fields, which had been stopped in 2015 due to concerns about the risks this chemical poses to human health and environmental sustainability. But this plan was suspended by the Constitutional Court until robust guarantees were offered by the government. In addition, on 21 August, another, local, court ordered the National Army to stop the forced eradication of illicit crops and to give priority to crop substitution.

Farmers are also threatened by powerful armed groups that rival official authorities in certain regions. Activists, human rights defenders, union and other community leaders have been killed by the hundreds in near absolute impunity.

In this context, some farmers are more frightened by the eradication task forces and armed groups than the pandemic.

The economic impact of the pandemic on coca growing communities should not be overlooked either. As in Bolivia, the price of coca has fallen and markets are paralysed, undermining families’ livelihoods and entrenching rural precarity.

Peru: The government is trying, but it’s not enough

In Peru, the price of coca leaf is reported to have gone down by up to 70 percent. This drop, accompanied by market paralysis, has raised concerns for the foreseeable future for farmers, although the price is expected to rise again once the lockdown restrictions are eased.

The state-owned company ENACO continues to operate, but most farmers sell their production to illicit operators and ENACO is unlikely to help them by buying their coca leaves.

In addition to coca, most farmers grow other crops, such as corn and bananas. But for them coca cultivation is a central means of subsistence. Even at reduced prices, coca generally yields more income than crops such as coffee or cocoa, of which prices have also been affected by the pandemic.

Since the introduction of the lockdown, the Peruvian government has stopped eradicating coca and is working with farmers to provide assistance. However, according to AIN, this aid has been unevenly attributed and many families are still waiting for it.

Peruvian authorities have also tried to take advantage of low coca prices to try to convince farmers to grow alternative crops, investing in coca-producing regions. However, without credible safety nets and clear commitments toward sustained investment, this incentive alone is not likely to be enough to prompt the switch. Researchers fear an upcoming recession may lead to the opposite, a new cultivation boom driven by one of the most resilient and established crops in the region: the coca leaf.

* This blog post was produced within the framework of a 4-month volunteering experience placement at the International Drug Policy Consortium as part of the student's MA Program 'Policies and Practices in International Organizations' at Sciences Po Grenoble.

Coca growers in Latin America need support, now

By Kathryn Ledebur, Linda Farthing and Thomas Grisaffi

Bolivia has seen widespread public protests in recent months against the interim government, led by Jeanine Añez, which has twice postponed elections due to coronavirus. Her government has repeatedly violated its mandate by passing new laws and persecuting its political opponents, including coca growers in the Chapare region east of Cochabamba, who we collaborate with on research projects.

Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of cocaine, a drug manufactured from coca leaves, which is central to Andean culture. Under the previous government of Evo Morales, coca growers benefited from a programme that allowed them to cultivate a plot of coca up to 2,500 square metres, and actively engaged farmers to self-police to respect these limits.

This policy, which emphasised community participation and respect for human rights, was lauded and funded by the European Union. Internationally recognised in the mainstream press as best practice in this area, Bolivia’s community coca control programme has long served as an example for cooperation in other parts of the world.

But this approach was recently reversed. One former EU official in the country confidentially told us that this represents a “significant setback”. Yet the EU has been helping to make this happen.

Bolivia reverses years of progress with new draconian cocaine policy, supported by the European Union

By Marianne Coulavin, Student - MA Program 'Policies and Practices in International Organizations', Sciences Po Grenoble*

(Most of this information was compiled in interviews with Dania Putri and Asmae, a young woman of the community of cannabis farmers in the Al Hoceima province of the Moroccan Rif region.)

Morocco is the world’s largest producer of cannabis resin, also known as hashish. In the Rif, the country’s northernmost region, cannabis has grown for centuries. Its mountainous topography and comparatively humid climate suit the ancient crop.

Cannabis cultivation is done in the open. During August and September, if you wander around Ketama, a small rural commune in the region, you are likely to see countless fields of cannabis plants ready to be harvested.

The central Rif is one of the poorest regions of Morocco. Cannabis cultivation is a matter of subsistence. For many households, it serves as a main source of income in a region with few alternative livelihood opportunities and limited public services.

Although growing cannabis is illegal in Morocco, it remains tolerated in the Rif region. Nationally, cannabis cultivation provides a living for around 90,000 to 140,000 families, covering around 50,000 hectares of land.

In order to understand cannabis farming in the Rif, one needs to look at an often unacknowledged fact: gendered labour roles. Men are generally in charge of selling the production while women work in the fields. Community leaders are generally men and thus the faces of the cannabis industry in the region. But women are the harvesting hands of the hashish that reaches Europe.

Farming cannabis is incredibly exerting, explains Asmae, a young woman from the Al Hoceima province. A typical working day in the field lasts some 14 hours; from before dawn, at 05:00, to almost sunset, at 19:00. With a brief 30-minute lunch break to barely recover.

As it could be expected, the daily work of women labourers has been impacted by lockdown measures implemented by the Moroccan government in an attempt to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.

Usually, to speed up cultivation and harvest, farmers hire workers; often young people looking for employment. But these extra pairs of hands are rare these days, as most come from different provinces and are not allowed to travel during pandemic restrictions. Women are left with no choice but to work harder to ensure cultivation runs smoothly.

Besides worsening harvesting conditions, cannabis farming communities are seeing pre-existing challenges exacerbated by the epidemic. In the last couple of years, growers’ earnings have been significantly reduced as prices have plummeted. Trade restrictions have further aggravated the situation, limiting access to foreign markets. As a result, some farmers have begun to stockpile their harvest. Only domestic sales, which normally account for 20% of the total, have remained stable.

Moroccan cannabis growers are also facing a dilemma. The rise in popularity of high-THC strains imported from Europe (locally known as ‘critical’) has conditioned cultivating practices in recent years. But these supposedly high-yielding varieties are also more resource-intensive, demanding higher financial investments, labour, and water. Especially compared to locally-adapted landraces, such as Beldia. While a recent revival of the latter is promising, the ecological impact of foreign demand compounds environmental concerns, such as deforestation. And adds to the burden faced by precarious cannabis growing communities during the pandemic.

To mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic, the Moroccan government has set up a support scheme ranging from 800 to 1,200 dirhams ($USD 82 - 124) per month depending on the size of the household. While support is welcome, this allowance will not suffice to alleviate the decades-long underdevelopment and marginalisation of the region.

Riffian cannabis growers would greatly benefit from robust investments in infrastructure and the nationwide legal regulation.

And those best placed to offer guidance on that process are traditional farming communities, and particularly women, with their centuries-old experience in cultivation, in deciding how best to advance to formal markets.

According to the Transnational Institute, a comprehensive plan for development in the Rif would include providing technical assistance to farmers, recognising the importance of cannabis to local communities, and exploring innovative and sustainable ways to improve other local sectors – such as tourism – to help diversify the local economy.

Despite the difficulties farmers face, cannabis production remains the most immediately viable and rapidly scalable livelihood in the Rif. As the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have disastrous health and socio-economic consequences around the globe, the legal regulation of cannabis could support the Moroccan peoples’ resilience.

Responses to COVID-19 impacts must include Moroccan cannabis farmers

According to reports in 2018 from African Union Member States, the consumption and trafficking of controlled substances have escalated in all five (5) AU Regions. Growing use of cocaine, tramadol, amphetamine type stimulants (ATS), new psychoactive substances (NPS) have been stated. Heroin consumption and injection is rising in Eastern and Southern Africa resulting (in the absence of the necessary health services) in high transmission rates of HIV and hepatitis among people who inject drugs, particularly women and young people.

Large shipments of heroin are transhipped on the high seas of Eastern Africa, and that of cocaine off-shore in the Atlantic Ocean, while on-shore shipments are made through harbours and airports across the continent. Women, especially those from lowincome backgrounds, continue to be vulnerable to recruitment as drug couriers. In West, East and Southern Africa trafficking of and/or diversion from licit batches of precursor chemicals for illicit use, especially ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, occurs frequently. This takes place in areas where ATS drugs are manufactured in clandestine laboratories on a large scale, resulting in online sales of these and other drugs, including NPS.

The African Union has since 1996 adopted Action Plans to address drug control and associated crime prevention on the continent, resulting in the establishment of institutional mechanisms in Member States, Regional Economic Communities and at the AU Commission to coordinate balanced and integrated responses to the mentioned drug control challenges.

The responses encapsulated in the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2019-2023) (AUPA) mirrors that of the African Common Position for the 2016 UNGASS General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem, as well as the seven (7) chapters of Operational Recommendations of the UNGASS Outcome Document. In addition, the AUPA contains two additional pillars with objectives and activities to address crime prevention, and coordination of the implementation of the AUPA at national, regional and continental levels, respectively.

The overall objective of the AUPA (2019-2023) is to improve the health, security and socio-economic well-being of the people of Africa by addressing drug trafficking and problematic drug use in all its forms and manifestations and preventing the onset of drug use.

Objectives and outputs/activities under the nine (9) chapters or pillars address the following:

Measures to tackle drug demand reduction and health issues associated with drug use, focusing on prevention and treatment of drug use with provisions for training of workers and professionals in these fields, parental skills training, life skills training for children and young people, reducing harm associated with drug use and implementing alternatives to punishment for drug use.

Availability and access to controlled substances for medical and scientific purposes while preventing their diversion, with emphasis on erasing barriers that suppress accessibility to medicines, including for the relief of pain and suffering, as well as reducing non-medical use of medicines and availability of counterfeit medicines

Measures to address drug supply reduction along with countering enablers of drug trafficking: firearms, corruption and money laundering which addresses illicit trafficking in drugs, drug law enforcement and intelligence sharing and ratification of AU instruments on combating corruption, money laundering, terrorism and trafficking in small arms.

Measures to address crime prevention and criminal justice reform, with emphasis on international cooperation on combating transnational organized crime, fighting emerging organized crime such as cybercrime, rise in gangs, extortion, violence and criminal governance. It involves continuous assessment of fragility and vulnerability, and analysis of risk, pressures and stress factors in societies.

Criminal justice reform, particularly addressing prison decongestion and noncustodial sentencing, is of critical importance to prevent reoffending, among others.

Cross cutting issues on drugs and human rights pertaining to all vulnerable groups, especially youth, women, children and communities, and this pillar provides for policy makers and law enforcement authorities to be oriented on human rights to health and safety as it relates to the field of drugs, emphasizing respect for and dignity of those in treatment, as well as protective and risk factors for vulnerable girls, women, children and youths. In this regard, national epidemiological surveillance on drug use, production and trafficking, research and data collection and national drug control coordination mechanisms are critical.

Evolving reality: trends and circumstances, emerging and persistent challenges and threats mainly focusses on countering the availability and use of NPS and ATS, sales of these drugs through the internet, and the importance of interregional forensic drug testing cooperation.

Alternative development and alternative means of livelihood, also targeting grower communities in the agricultural sector with a specific focus on Technical, Vocational Education and Training (TVET) for youth and women employment, including economic and social infrastructure development.

International and regional cooperation based on the principle of common and shared responsibility which makes provision for engagement with international partners for technical and financial support, for participation in regional, continental and international fora and for fast-tracking of extradition and mutual legal assistance arrangements.

Continental, regional and national management, oversight, reporting, monitoring and evaluation of the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2019-2023) entails actions by the African Union Commission to account to the AU Policy Organs on the implementation and impact of the AUPA (2019-2023).

Alternative livelihoods