The Cannabis Social Clubs at the cross-roads

The last few years have witnessed a boom in new cannabis user associations in Spain. Although there are no reliable figures for them, most are known to have been created for the collective cultivation of marihuana crops, and are now several hundred-strong. They are mainly found in Catalonia, which is also home to the largest of them: some have existed for only a short time but already have several thousand members.

Two kinds of cannabis clubs are developing in this community and it is here that the difference between them can most clearly be seen. At least on paper, both models adopt the same legal structure and maintain that they have similar aims. But such similarities in form cannot conceal profound differences in function, to the extent that they are now described as Cannabis Commercial Clubs, as against Cannabis Social Clubs.

The rise in cannabis clubs of all kinds, with well-known initiatives like the currently frustrated plantation in Rasquera (in Tarragona), has forced the hand of Catalonia’s autonomous government. It has announced that it will set up a commission to debate the regulation of the associations, following a similar move in the Basque Country. This has resulted in an active debate within the cannabis users associations, and also between them, as they bring different approaches to the debate.

The Catalonian authorities seem comfortable with the Cannabis Social Club model promoted by the Federation of Cannabis Users Associations (FAC), whose members are small associations which produce marihuana for their own use. However, the larger clubs are not federation members. These clubs, which could be generally described as “membership-only coffee-shops”, are gaining ground thanks to their high budgets and their links with part of the cannabis industry, and the Catalonian authorities might eventually incline towards a model that is large-scale but easier to keep an eye on: it is far cheaper to watch fifty large associations than five hundred small ones.

The FAC has opted to maintain the social club model, as the one that provides the best defence of users’ rights, democratic and transparent administration and risk reduction. Given the threat of the clubs’ becoming commercial and ending up as pseudo catering companies with a membership card, the focus is moving to a model which until very recently had barely been suggested, but which has demonstrated a number of virtues that have made it a point of reference for the question of fair and effective drug policies.

Although the expression “Spanish model” is now commonly used when referring to the Cannabis Social Clubs, the model is not based on any specific regulations, as Spain’s law on illegal drugs is unclear. In fact, the clubs grew gradually out of some of the principles gathered piecemeal from the Supreme Court’s position on “shared consumption”. This was not a ruling on cannabis, but mainly developed out of sentences given to groups of heroin and cocaine users who got together to buy from the black market and then shared the drug between them.

It is difficult to make cannabis cultivation fit into the ruling, since unlike heroin and cocaine, cannabis is not bought exclusively on the black market but is easy for people to grow by themselves, so has to be stored in amounts considered likely to be used for trafficking. In fact, any amount greater than the equivalent of a few days’ personal consumption is generally assumed to be intended for drug-dealing.

The FAC member associations have taken the principles of shared consumption, their own practical experience, relevant court rulings and consultations with various bodies and used the information to develop a working model which is democratic, functions as a cooperative, is self-policing, transparent and is open to public inspection: a model known as a cannabis social club.

The formula was not thought out beforehand however, but was developed to take advantage of legal loopholes. Early on, when the Catalonian association ARSEC decided to grow crops collectively for its members, the initiative was described as “the Catalonian breakthrough*“, suggesting that ARSEC was in some way opening the breach in the walls of prohibition. But it was not so much an attempt to establish a predefined model as to see how far the current legal framework would stretch, given the difficulties involved in amending drug treaties.

The CSCs have developed through trying to fill the gaps in the law, but it is not clear what leeway these provide. The precedent on shared consumption establishes a series of conditions if the activity is not to be considered an offence: the people involved must be individuals, be part of a closed circuit and be regular consumers, none may make a profit from the activity and the amounts distributed must be for almost immediate use.

Clearly these conditions do not clear up all doubts. How many people can be in the closed circuit, since the point is to avoid the indiscriminate distribution of the drug? This is one of the issues to be thought out, but clearly a private group cannot expand indefinitely. The vast size of some of the clubs created in recent years give rise to reasonable doubt. Can a circuit with 10,000 active members be really closed?

What is clear is that current Spanish law does not allow any commercial cannabis distribution system open to the general public. So opening a Dutch-style coffee shop in Spain would be a crime. With that option out of the question, the anti-prohibition movement concentrated on developing a non-commercial system to be more compatible with the interests and needs of cannabis users. If it had not had to deal with these constraints, the movement for making marijuana use a normal activity would have started with the business sectors and not the activisits, and the model would undoubtedly have been very different and in the opinion of the FAC, far less satisfactory for the individual consumer.

From the creation of the first CSC back in 2001, it has been clear that this model perfectly covers members’ consumption needs, providing them with quality-assured cannabis, at reasonable prices and not acquired from the black market shaped by prohibition. There are other models which could give the same guarantees, but the ten years’ of practical experience demonstrate that the very fact that this is not a commercial model offers a series of further advantages, especially the management of the risks associated with consumption.

For a start, the absence of a profit motive reduces the risk of promoting the crop for commercial purposes. The fact that a CSC is a closed circle and can only be joined through an invitation from a member means that there is no point in advertising the club. Members develop links which are not usually found among clients of a commercial enterprise, particularly if they are occasional customers. In various associations the members evidently feel a sense of community which encourages them to take care of each other and share information with their peers, which helps reduce risks.

As the collective is small and members know and trust each other and there is a detailed register of each member’s use, it is easier to detect questionable consumption. If a member is suspected of being troublesome as a result of using cannabis, the club members talk to the person involved to bring to his or her attention the changes they have seen in behaviour and consumption patterns and apply a protocol. The clubs in the Basque country bring in a specialist in drug dependence hired to deal with the problem and who treats the person free of charge if he or she wishes. No coffee shop, bar, or tobacco shop offers similar services.

Spanish law governing associations stipulates that the members’ general assembly is the highest decision-taking body. Each member becomes part of the assembly on joining the association. The board of directors has to submit a balance of accounts and management to the assembly every year and members must vote to approve it. This ensures a level of transparency and gives members a degree of influence which would be impossible in a commercial society in which they would be no more than clients. And the larger the company involved in the production and distribution, the harder it is to audit the substance and the risks entailed, something only too obvious in the tobacco industry.

The Basque branch of the FAC, (EUSFAC), asked two prestigious university professors of criminal law to give a legal ruling on the issue. Both of them (Juan Muñoz, who wrote the previous report in 2001, and José Luis Díez Ripollés) teach at MalagaUniversity. The report, which has not yet been published, refers to the Cannabis Social Clubs as forms of “self organisation of consumption” which are neither crimes nor an administrative offence provided that they adhere to certain limits explained above.

The report makes it clear that current legislation makes no specific reference to cannabis distribution which is not through the democratic and participatory organisation of the users themselves. Unless the criminal code and the interpretation of it changes, Spain has no place for commercial enterprises, like some of the larger “clubs”, however they may try to hide behind the facade of an association.

Díez Ripollés and Muñoz have proposed a specific legal formula for the CSC: the creation of producer and consumer cooperative societies, in the terms of Law 27/1999 (the Cooperatives Act). Such cooperatives will be non-profit and will have regular members, employee members and associate members. The cannabis must be supplied from the legal market and as far as possible the club must encourage its members to consume it responsibly. The FAC clearly opts for this kind of democratic and non-profit formula, balancing producers’ and consumers’ interests and rights, rather than other types of organisation which give priority to the financial interests of a minority who distribute what others produce with generally little concern for the final impact of their merchandise. There are already many products subjected to the so-called “markets” and the disastrous consequences of organising people’s lives in terms of business and profits become clearer every day. May cannabis be spared that fate.

Keep up-to-date with drug policy developments by subscribing to the IDPC Monthly Alert.

Between collective organisation and commercialisation

How to work on drugs without promoting consumption? Are there chances of recovery? When is control lost in drug use? How to work on prevention? What is harm reduction? These were some of the questions that guided the workshop "Strategies for approaching the drug problem" held on 23 and 24 July in Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires province.

In order to discuss drugs and harm reduction among those who handle religious community centers, and rethink the possibilities of action of each community center in relation to drug-related problems, a training on 

"Strategies for approaching the drug problem"

 with support from the Evangelical Church of Río de la Plata (IERP) was carried out in Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires province, on 23-24 July 2012.

The workshop was attended by neighborhood promoters, psychologists, outreach workers, recreational center workers, cooks and members of the community centers Angelelli, Caritas and Centro Arcángel Gabriel, from different areas of the province of Buenos Aires.

Over two days, social representations on drugs were reviewed, harm reduction strategies and the importance of networking were analyzed (with the idea of improving the institution networks, and contemplate the networks of young people). In addition, proposals of approach were developed in each community center, for consideration within each institution.

Strategies for approaching the drug problem - Reports from an Intercambios/IERP workshop

Following is UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s message for International Youth Day, to be observed on 12 August:

Today’s generation of youth — the largest the world has ever known, and the vast majority of whom live in developing countries — has unprecedented potential to advance the well-being of the entire human family. Yet too many young people, including those who are highly educated, suffer from low-wage, dead-end work and record levels of unemployment.

The global economic crisis has hit youth the hardest and many are understandably discouraged by rising inequalities. A large number have no immediate prospects and are disenfranchised from the political, social and development processes in their countries. Without urgent measures, we risk creating a “lost generation” of squandered talent and dreams.

Working with and for young people is one of my top priorities. Youth are a transformative force; they are creative, resourceful and enthusiastic agents of change, be it in public squares or cyberspace. From their pivotal role in efforts to achieve freedom, democracy and equality, to their global mobilization in support of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, youth have energetically demonstrated yet again their capacity and desire to turn the tide of history and tackle global challenges.

Young men and women are not passive beneficiaries, but equal and effective partners. Their aspirations extend far beyond jobs; youth also want a seat at the table — a real voice in shaping the policies that shape their lives. We need to listen to and engage with young people. We need to establish more and stronger mechanisms for youth participation. The time has come to integrate youth voices more meaningfully into decision-making processes at all levels.

Around the world there is growing recognition of the need to strengthen policies and investments involving young people. On International Youth Day, I call on Governments, the private sector, civil society and academia to open doors for young people and strengthen partnerships with youth-led organizations. Youth can determine whether this era moves toward greater peril or more positive change.

Let us support the young people of our world so they grow into adults who raise yet more generations of productive and powerful leaders.

Secretary-General warns against creating ‘Lost Generation of Squandered Talent and Dreams’

Honduras has become the newest front in the US war on drugs in Latin America. The US has provided financial support for both the police and the military there in spite of its deep corruption issues.

Furthermore, members of both institutions have been linked to a range of killings. Political dissidents, human rights workers and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community have all been killed at alarming rates.

In May, a mission in the Moskitia region, which was led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), left four innocent civilians killed and four others wounded. It was followed by two more incidents where a US DEA agent shot and killed an alleged drug trafficker. Local communities have demanded a thorough investigation but so far nothing has been done.

The US has a long and controversial history in Honduras. In the 1980s, the US built a base there and trained an elite Honduran military unit. That unit went on to carry out tortures, kidnappings and killings.

Who is responsible? What should be the role of the US in Honduras? And what happened that night in the Moskitia when a US raid ended up leaving innocent people dead?

 travels to Honduras, the country with the highest homicide rate in the world, to find out.

Click here for the video on Al Jazeera's webpage.

The US and Honduras - Fault Lines

Burmese authorities are warning that the country's amphetamine problem is “very dangerous” now, after seizing more than 1.4 million amphetamine pills and 116 kilos of heroin in July.

“It's getting worse,” an official told 

 recently. “Although the country has vowed to be drug free by 2014, it can only be opium free because of the problem of stimulant tablets."

Official media on Wednesday reported 342 drug-related cases across the country in July, resulting in 473 suspects arrested.

Most of the stimulant tablets were seized in the eastern border areas, but the drugs are making their way to Rangoon, officials said.

Amphetamine production and poppy cultivation are one source of revenue for some armed rebel groups, say government officials.

Burma is the world's second-largest opium poppy grower after Afghanistan.

Shan state is a major source of methamphetamine tablets, according to the UN, which estimates that global seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants nearly tripled between 1998 and 2010, reflecting fast-growing demand.

 reported that the UN drug agency said it was “encouraged by the recent cease-fire agreements and the fact that the national authorities have expanded the areas in Shan State in which the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC) is allowed to work.”

Gary Lewis, the UNODC Bangkok representative, said, “Solve the challenges of chronic poverty, decreasing rural food security, and armed conflict – and you can begin to draw farmers away from poppy.”

Alternative livelihood support is needed if growers are to be weaned off this double-edged source of income, he said.

“To be effective we need to give farming communities alternatives which can provide a sustainable basis for them to earn a livelihood,” said Lewis. “Farmers grow opium poppy to buy food, pay off debt and have a cash income to pay school fees and health expenses.”

UNODC and NGOs have been working with Burmese farmers for the past decade, trying to lure them away from poppy cultivation by providing alternative livelihood solutions, along with improved access to roads, waterways, irrigation, and community health services.

“Until recently, UNODC alternative development assistance, funded by the European Union and the governments of Germany and Japan, was limited to small development projects in just three south Shan townships – wholly inadequate to Shan State and Myanmar's needs for improved infrastructure, markets, schools and sustainable livelihoods,” said Lewis.

More than half a century of internal conflict between government forces and various ethnic and political rebel groups tore the country apart, causing instability and poverty, said UNODC. Cease-fire treaties signed in early 2012 with groups in northern Myanmar, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), have allowed access to areas that were previously unreachable.

An opium survey by UNODC in 2011 pointed out that there has been a marked increase in the area under opium cultivation in Myanmar – from 38,100 hectares in 2010 to 43,600 hectares in 2011 – mostly in Shan State. Yet the government has significantly increased its eradication efforts and a total of 6,124 hectares of opium poppy were destroyed there in 2011, compared to 5,316 hectares eradicated in 2010, the survey noted.

The UNODC estimated that 246,000 households are involved in poppy cultivation in Burma, with 91 per cent of opium cultivation occurring in Shan State, according to an article published on its website in May.

It said that opium poppy eradication is a priority of the Burmese government and recent government campaigns have seen a significant increase in the area of poppy crops destroyed.

However, while serving a drug control goal, “this can have disastrous consequences for poppy-farming households which are generally very poor and often in debt,” said the report. “Many grow poppy simply to buy food and other subsistence needs.”

Done without first developing alternative livelihood options, the widespread eradication of poppy can increase food insecurity as households dependent on income from now-destroyed poppy scramble to find other sources of income to feed their families,” said Jason Eligh, the UNODC country manager.

He said the main drivers behind recent increases in opium poppy cultivation are chronic poverty, decreasing rural food security, and regional insecurity due to armed conflict. In 2011, the UNODC started to implement three new alternative development / sustainable livelihoods and food security projects in southern Shan State. Providing assistance directly to opium-dependent communities on the ground, the projects are funded by the European Union and the Government of Germany.

Burma confirms drug problem worse

ACT Chief Minister and Minister for Health Ms Katy Gallagher has made a positive announcement this morning.

She released a draft blood borne virus (BBV) management strategy for corrections, which will help protect the health of the whole community.

The announcement included her comments below:

The strategy covers educating prisoners about the spread of blood borne viruses, steps to cut off the supply of drugs in the prison, treatment and screening, and provides access to needle and syringe programs, which have been proven to be successful in the wider community, on a trial basis.

“After many meetings and discussions with staff, unions and non-government organisations I have formed the view that a full needle and syringe exchange program, as outlined in various options in the Moore Report, would not be able to be practically implemented at the AMC at this time.

“However, I do believe that it is worthwhile examining a model which has been put to me by doctors which addresses access to clean injecting equipment if considered clinically appropriate.

“The model, known as “one-for-one” medical model would see the doctors, not politicians, as the decision makers.

“The next step is to convene an implementation group to provide advice on how this model could be implemented.”

The following comments were released by Anex this morning.

Chief Minister’s ‘healthier cells’ strategy first in line with new UN guidelines

The announcement was welcomed by public health organisation Anex which has coordinated a program to demonstrate support for improved prisoner health amongst a wide ranging group of eminent Australians.

Anex convenes the Harm Minimisation in Prisons Committee which has been the leading group researching the issue and coordinating public education regarding how regulated sterile injecting equipment distribution could be piloted in Australian prisons.

“A wide range of eminent Australians support the introduction of regulated sterile injecting equipment distribution, including Sir Gustav Nossal and Nobel Laureate Peter Doherty,” said Anex CEO Mr John Ryan.

“This support –including by the Australian Medical Association – is purely on sound public health concerns. Today’s announcement is worth applauding regardless of anyone’s political affiliation because the reality is there is no drug-free prison,” he said.

“The strategy announced maintains tight security, but there will be additional health professional involvement in blood borne virus prevention and drug treatment access,” said Mr Ryan.

It is acceptable that the start date for the program is some time away as there will need to be substantial preparation, including workplace training with prison staff such as prison officers, said Mr Ryan.

“There will need to be extensive cooperation with the prison officers, including with the CPSU, and training. It has always been expected that there would need to be a genuine education program for staff,” he said.

“The ACT Corrections Management Act makes it clear that the Government and authorities had to make at least some progress, otherwise it was leaving itself wide open to a form of legal challenge which had a very good chance of success,” he said.

Mr Ryan said the Chief Minister’s announcement was “entirely consistent with new guidelines from key United Nations organisations” on preventing blood-borne virus prevention in prisons. The guidelines were released on 26 July, 2012.

The policy guidelines specifically list sterile needle and syringe distribution as one of 15 recommended interventions in prisons, Mr Ryan said.

“Katy Gallagher’s cautious and wise approach toward healthier cells sets an ACT precedent that can assist other governments here and internationally plan holistic health strategies that include sterile injecting equipment provision in prisons,” Mr Ryan said.

“The UN guidelines also list ‘protecting staff from occupational hazards’, so it is fair and reasonable that a thorough process of consulting with the workforce is part of any roll-out in the next six months or so,” Mr Ryan said.

According to the UNODC, the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Development Programme (who co-authored the policy guidelines), it is aimed at “supporting decision makers in ministries of justice, authorities responsible for closed settings and ministries of health, as well as authorities responsible for workplace safety and occupational health, in planning and implementing a response to HIV in closed settings.”

A step forward for in-prison sterile injecting equipment 

New Zealand’s Associate Minister of Health Peter Dunne has announced a new system for regulating synthetic highs. Due to come into effect next year, the regime places the onus on the legal high industry to prove their products are safe before they go on sale. The approval process will be similar to that used for medicines and will include pre-clinical toxicology testing and human clinical trials. The results of these will be considered by a regulatory body to be set up within the Ministry of Health.

If this body decides a product poses too great a risk to people’s health, it will be classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act. The substance will then be treated like any other illicit drug, complete with penalties for possession and supply. If a substance is deemed to be sufficiently low risk, then the regulatory body will issue a licence and it can then be manufactured and sold. The sale of any approved substance is likely to be subject to conditions such as a purchase age and pricing regulations.

For more information, please read the Cabinet papers and Regulatory Impact Statements or visit the New Zealand Drug Foundation’s media release on the new regime.

New regulations for psychoactive substances announced in New Zealand

For the first time, the drug czar has supported broadening access to naloxone, the life-saving prescription drug that immediately reverses overdoses of heroin and prescription painkillers.

Speaking on Wednesday at a North Carolina overdose-prevention program, the Obama administration’s drug czar Gil Kerlikowske called for increased action to prevent drug overdose deaths. Notably, Kerlikowske urged wider distribution of a medication called naloxone, an antidote to overdoses of opioid drugs, including prescription pain relievers and heroin, saying that “naloxone can be expanded beyond public health officials.”

Currently, naloxone is available only by prescription and is otherwise accessed easily only by health professionals and some law enforcement officers. Kerlikowske’s comments mark the first time the drug czar — who is more formally known as the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy — has voiced support for broadening access to naloxone by addicted people, pain patients and their families. On Wednesday, he spoke with officials and others involved with Project Lazarus, a North Carolina program that pioneered wider distribution of the medication and is seen as a model prevention program for its comprehensive approach to fighting overdose and prescription drug misuse.

“As valuable as naloxone is, it’s only a small piece of the broad spectrum of drug use prevention,” Kerlikowske stressed, adding, “We’re very serious about removing the legal impediments that can mean the difference between life and death. The odds of surviving an overdose, much like the odds of surviving a heart attack, really depend on how quickly the victim receives treatment.”

To illustrate that point, Kerlikowske recounted the story of a young woman who survived an overdose thanks to the quick administration of naloxone. Her brother, who was enrolled in a drug treatment program participating in Project Lazarus, used the naloxone kit he had received from his treatment provider to save his 26-year-old sister’s life, when he found her “unresponsive and not breathing and her face was blue,” as Kerlikowske put it.

The man had initially called his counselor, who told him to hang up and dial 911 and use the naloxone. Within about a minute or two of receiving the drug, his sister woke up. Four days after “her near death experience,” Kerlikowske said, “she entered treatment. Without naloxone, she wouldn’t have had that choice.”

Naloxone, sold under the brand name Narcan, immediately reverses overdoses of heroin and prescription pain medications like Oxycontin, even if these opioids are combined with alcohol or other sedatives. The medication is non-addictive and does not cause harm if used in error, although it can induce non-life-threatening withdrawal symptoms in people who are dependent on opioids.

This spring, the FDA held a meeting to discuss making naloxone available over the counter, but such a move would require a manufacturer to seek approval to do so, which would in turn require expensive drug testing — that does not appear to be forthcoming. There are other regulatory paths to over-the-counter status that would bypass this hurdle, but it is not clear whether Obama administration officials will pursue them; neither Kerlikowske nor his office provided further specifics.

Dr. Nora Volkow, director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, has supported broader distribution of the overdose antidote.

Earlier this month, a bill to provide federal grants to expand naloxone programs like Project Lazarus, known as the Stop Overdose Stat (SOS) Act, was introduced in the House by Rep. Mary Bono Mack (R-Calif.)* and Rep. Donna Edwards (D-Md.), with bipartisan support from two dozen other members, but its chances of passage and the amount of funding it would receive are also not known.

“I welcome Director Kerlikowske’s announcement today to expand the availability of naloxone, proven to be an effective treatment in reversing drug overdose,” Rep. Edwards said in an email. “This is a critical component of H.R. 6311, the Stop Overdose Stat (SOS) Act.”

On Wednesday, officials from Project Lazarus, which is based in Wilkes County, N.C., presented information on the program’s effectiveness and its collaborative, cross-disciplinary approach to overdose prevention. In addition to naloxone distribution, the program involves physician and widespread community education, law enforcement efforts to fight illegal prescribing, pill take-back days and use of the state’s prescription drug monitoring program. Unlike other efforts to reduce prescription drug misuse, it actively involves chronic pain patients and those who care for them.

Two years after Project Lazarus began, overdose death rates in Wilkes County dropped 67%, after having risen steadily for years, according to a presentation by Rev. Fred Brason, project director of the program. The program also appeared to reduce problem prescribing without harming legitimate pain patients: in 2008, 80% of overdose death victims had received at least one prescription for their medications from a local prescriber; in 2011, none did.

As a mother who lost her daughter to overdose said at Wednesday’s meeting, crying as she spoke, “If I had known there were things out there like naloxone, I could have helped her. I wouldn’t be here today talking to you all. I could have had my daughter.”

Preventing overdose: Obama Administration Drug Czar calls for wider access to overdose antidote

Brazil, like many countries in Latin America, has struggled over the last 20 years with how to effectively address high levels of crime and violence. Although crime rates in some parts of the country have dropped substantially over the last decade—most notably the Southeast—crime rates in other parts of the country—especially in the North and Northeast—have risen dramatically over the same period.[1] Given that public security policies in Brazil are decided at the state level, there is significant variance between the experiences of each state. Although there really is no “Brazilian model” for citizen security, there are a variety of experiences in Brazil that are worth studying by others in the region looking for ways to address high levels of crime and violence.

In order to exchange ideas on different citizen security policies, the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (

) hosts an annual meeting where police, government officials, civil society organizations, and academics from all over Brazil have the opportunity to discuss specific citizen security issues. By design, the meeting engages many differing voices, views, and opinions, recognizing that such dialogue is a necessary step in the process of developing innovative solutions and that guaranteeing public safety is the responsibility of not only the police, but also of several local and national government agencies, as well as members of civil society. This year, WOLA participated in the Forum’s Annual meeting in Porto Alegre, and of particular interest to our work on citizen security in Latin America were the panel discussions and workshops on violence prevention, drug policy, and organized crime.

Violence prevention: Policy debates and dialogues

The workshop on violence prevention included the participation of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and was coordinated by the URBAL project, a joint effort by three local governments in Brazil, Peru, and Italy that seeks to strengthen violence prevention policies in their respective cities. The workshop included 40 participants from the local civil and military police, police officers from other Brazilian states, academics, local and international NGOs, and multilateral organizations. The diverse group discussed policies for violence prevention from a variety of perspectives, focusing on how to best identify problems experienced on the ground and subsequently coordinate a variety of government agencies and civil society organizations to address these problems.

The workshop concluded that local governments need to include a variety of public institutions when developing violence prevention policies, not just the police; that communities need to be able to respect local police in order for prevention policies to work; that there needs to be a systematic way to provide feedback about projects to adapt to changing realities; that there needs to be a clear definition of the problems, methods to solve them, and ways to measure progress; and that the role of the police needs to be clearly defined so that they are not merely used as political tools. Some of the most useful feedback during the workshop came from police officers who shared some of their experiences working on the ground with violence prevention, as well as frustrations over constantly having to adapt to changing political agendas. They also said that, in their opinion, the most effective programs were ones that affected entire families or schools instead of just a targeted section of youth.

Many participants, including those from the Northeast state of Pernambuco, stressed the importance of mapping out existing social programs to identify what areas of need are not being met, and the importance of coming up with metrics to measure success of projects so that failed projects can be redesigned and successful projects can be used as models. The members of the police were among the most vocal in calling for a sustained, integral approach to violence prevention that includes long-term funding and the participation of various governmental institutions. Obstacles remain, however, in identifying how to effectively bring local groups, policymakers, and police together to actually decide local prevention policies; specifying each sector’s role; and ensuring the execution of projects. But, as noted in past WOLA reports,[2] this process is a necessary step in successfully addressing problems of crime and violence at the local level. The discussion’s inclusion of all parts of the equation, from theoretical sociological issues to practical day-to-day implementations of these policies, made for an extremely useful debate on violence prevention policies in Brazil.

Drug policy: Alternatives to the current paradigms

The drug policy panel also drew a broad range of participants and audience members, including professors, researchers, former and current members of the federal government, activists, and police officers. The presentations encouraged the audience to challenge current paradigms and devise alternatives to current drug policies in Brazil. The policy issues discussed ranged from how to deal with problems of overcrowding in prisons, unjust or discriminatory law enforcement practices, health concerns, and proposals to change the 2006 Drug Law (

Since the 2006 Drug Law was passed, the number of people incarcerated for drug-related crimes in Brazil has more than doubled.[3] The law decriminalized possession of drugs for personal use and increased the amount of prison time for drug trafficking, but it did not specify how to differentiate between the two. Because of the law’s lack of clarity, many people who possessed small amounts of drugs for personal use have been labeled traffickers and received long sentences. Furthermore, many experts—including several panel members—claim that poor people living in marginalized areas are disproportionately affected by the law’s ambiguity and are more frequently labeled by police as drug traffickers than people arrested with drugs in rich areas. One panelist argued that drug policy goals should be centered upon public health and violence reduction; current metrics, however, measure success as the number of drug apprehensions and arrests, which do little to reflect public health or levels of violence. There is currently momentum to reform the 2006 drug law so that it establishes clearer thresholds for defining who is a user and who is a drug trafficker so that there is less room for discrimination.

The panel on organized crime included the theoretical perspective from the Rio Grande do Sul Police Chief; the experiences in São Paulo with the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), an organized criminal network run from the prisons in São Paulo; and the experience in Rio de Janeiro with its militias, which are criminal groups made up of off-duty or retired police officers that control large amounts of territory in Rio. Guaracy Mingardi, a former investigator for the São Paulo police, talked about how the PCC formed originally as a protection scheme within the prisons and as a way to demand better prison conditions. Later, the PCC transformed into an organized criminal network that dominated nearly the entire prison system in the state and ran a huge network of criminal activities outside of the prisons using cell phones and extortions. While the violence associated with the PCC in São Paulo has declined over the last few years—a change that is sometimes attributed to a truce between the PCC and the police—the PCC remain a dominant force within the prison system and still conduct illegal activities outside of it. Mingardi stressed the need for cooperation from the penitentiary system, not just the police, to deal with this kind of organized crime.

The presentation about the militias by Vinicius George, a member of the Rio Civilian Police and staffer for Rio de Janeiro State Legislator Marcelo Freixo, provided an interesting perspective on how a broad coalition of members from civil society, the press, and the government can work together against organized crime. In 2008, George and Freixo, who has long been a defender of human rights in Rio, led a Parliamentary Investigation Commission (

, CPI) into the militias to expose their links to the local political system. The investigation received support from the media, local civil society organizations, favela residents, and participation from trusted police sources to collect tips from hotlines and conduct interviews. Upon finishing the investigation, the Commission published a 282 page report detailing their findings. Over 150 criminal prosecution cases were opened, and many of those involved, including acting and former police officers and firefighters as well as elected officials, were convicted and sentenced to prison time. The report exposed the links between politicians and militia groups, taking an important first step toward dismantling these organized criminal groups. However, the militias’ economic interests were never dealt with as thoroughly as the links to the political system were with the CPI investigation, which has allowed for their continued existence.

In order for the militias to be fully disarticulated, the government of Rio will have to address the economic interests of the militias and bring in formal services to these communities, such as city bus transportation routes, trash collection, gas, internet, and cable, which are currently controlled by the militias. Until the state displaces these criminal organizations and establishes a legitimate, long-term presence, the problem will continue to increase. Although there has only been limited success in disarticulating the links between the militias and the political system in Rio, the 2008 Militia CPI exposed the previously ignored problem and showed that with broad support from a variety of actors, difficult and politically sensitive problems associated with organized crime can begin to be addressed. It also serves as an example of how human rights defenders can take the lead in fighting organized crime by ensuring the rights of marginalized people and by holding state actors accountable for pervasive corruption.

Many who study issues of public safety in Brazil focus on the innovative experience of the Police Pacification Units (

UPP) in Rio de Janeiro,[4] as they have received positive national and international press and have achieved a reduction in homicides in the affected areas, but Brazil can offer much more to regional debates on citizen security than just the experience with the UPPs. The Rio UPP experience is in no way the “Brazilian model” for citizen security, nor should it be the only strategy studied by other countries in the region looking for new ideas on how to combat crime and violence. Besides the issues addressed in the panels described above, the dramatic reductions in crime rates in São Paulo and Pernambuco over the last decade should be studied in more detail. In these two very different contexts, there are a variety of factors contributing to violence reduction that could provide new ideas for crime prevention and reduction in other areas of the country or in other countries in the hemisphere, such as arms control, investment in the professionalization of the police, and local development projects. Civil society organizations in both of these states have played an important role in the proposal and implementation of policies, and these groups could share their experiences advocating for rights-respecting public security policies with colleagues.

Additionally, Brazil has expanded its use of crime observatories and statistics gathering. In 2007, the Forum began collecting data on crime and violence from the state governments and publishing the statistics in the yearly 

published in 2007 (for which good data was hard to find), it has been a useful tool in showing the need for systematic and uniform reporting of criminal data so that policies address current realities on the ground. Regina Miki, the Brazilian Secretary for Public Security (

Secretária Nacional de Segurança Pública

), announced at the Forum’s annual meeting in Port Alegre this July that the federal government was going to launch the National System of Information for Public Security, Prisons, and Drugs (

Sistema Nacional de Informações de Segurança Pública, Prisionais e sobre Drogas

, SINESP) in 2013, which will help make data collection in these areas uniform. The creation of SINESP was largely a response to the Forum’s 

, which pointed out that the lack of uniform data was presenting a major problem for analysts and policy makers working on issues of public safety. Collecting reliable statistics on crime and violence is also a major obstacle in other countries in Latin America, and policy makers and advocates in other countries trying to address these issues could learn valuable lessons from the process currently underway in Brazil.

In 2007, after years of advocacy by many Forum members and other activists, the Brazilian Congress passed the law creating the National Program for Public Safety with Citizenship (

Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania

 Pronasci). This innovative federal program coordinates strategies for violence prevention and law enforcement at the national level with a strong emphasis on social policies, the protection of victims, and respect for human rights. It also emphasizes the participation of at-risk youth, police, and civil society organizations in the formation of these policies. While the program has been scaled back during the Dilma administration, it still represents a huge advancement in the promotion of a human rights-focused citizen security strategy in Brazil and should not be abandoned. At this year’s meeting, members of the Forum sent a letter to the federal government encouraging the Dilma administration to reassume the role of promoting rights-respecting public security policies throughout the country, a role that was assumed by the Lula administration but that has been severely reduced during the current government.

Unfortunately, there really is no magic bullet that can solve all problems associated with crime and violence in every context. No one specific method of addressing crime that has success in one city, state, or country should be transferred to another without adaptation to local realities, if it is transferrable at all. However, the process of involving various relevant sectors (policy makers, police, local communities, NGOs, academics, etc.), examining the causes of crime, and tailoring policies to address local problems is a lesson learned in many crime reduction experiences in Brazil that should be emphasized when attempting to solve similar problems elsewhere.

*Joe Bateman is WOLA's Program Officer for Brazil and Citizen Security

Mapa da Violência 2012: Os Novos Padrões da Violência Homicida no Brasil

. http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2012/mapa2012_web.pdf

Daring to Care: Community-Based Responses to Youth Gang Violence in Central America and Central American Immigrant Communities in the United States

addresses some of the difficulties associated with coordinating a variety of actors at the community level to address crime and violence. The 2011 WOLA report 

Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment

also stresses the need to include a variety of actors when forming and implementing public policies to address violence.

[3]See the chapter on Brazilin the 2010 WOLA report 

Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America

[4]See “‘Os donos do morro’: uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das unidades de polícia pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro,” a study coordinated by Ignacio Cano for the Brazilian Forum on Public Safety and Laboratory for Violence Analysis of the Rio de Janeiro State University. See also the two part study from the Center for Security and Citizenship Studies, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs): O que pensam os policiais.”

Brazilian citizen security policies: Variety of experiences useful in regional debates

A Developed Country NGO Delegation position is now available on the Board of Directors of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

This representative will be selected to serve up to three years (beginning November 2012), subject to an annually conducted performance review. The delegation will seek regional balance among its three official representatives wherever possible.

The candidates should send applications with all required documents to:

Call for nominations: 2012 Communications Focal Point, Developed Country NGO Delegation, Global Fund Board

To mark International Overdose Day, Youth RISE has produced this educational video covering:

For more information, please visit the Youth RISE website.

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